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Arrest and Citation: Definition
and Analysis
I INTRODUCTION
The United States Constitution does not use the word "arrest".
The fourth amendment provides: "The right of the people to be
secure in their persons, ... against unreasonable ... seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon proba-
ble cause,... particularly describing ... the persons ... to be
seized."' Thus, any definition of "arrest" must be sought in stat-
utes and cases. The courts have defined "arrest" as falling some-
where between two extremes. In its most inclusive sense, it is any
interference with a person's freedom of locomotion, which if un-
privileged, would generally constitute common-law false imprison-
ment. In its most exclusive sense, an arrest consists of taking
custody of a person for the purpose of conducting a criminal pro-
ceeding.2
Questions such as what, when, how, why, and, by what author-
ity, concerning an arrest, have troubled Anglo-American legal in-
stitutions for centuries.3 The concern aroused by such questions
contributed to the American Revolution and the adoption of the
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.4 These
questions remain critically important today, even without the ad-
ded pressure of recent judicial developments.
In human terms, the consequences of the arrest may be ulti-
* BA., 1971, University of Nebraska; J.D., 1975, University of Nebraska College
of Law. Partner, Mills, Mills & Gless, Osceola, Nebraska; County Attorney,
Polk County, Nebraska. The author wishes to thank Professors Richard S.
Harnsberger and John R. Snowden, University of Nebraska College of Law,
for their editorial advice, encouragement and support.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2. W. LAFAVE, ARREST, THE DECISION TO TAKE A SUSPECT INTO CUSTODY 3-4
(Remington ed. 1965).
3. 2 M. HALE, TiE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 84-97 (1st Am. ed. 1847).
For a discussion of contemporary arrest law in the United Kingdom, see Tell-
ing, Arrest and Detention-The Conceptual Maze, 1978 CRIM. L REV. 320; Lid-
stone, A Maze in Law!, 1978 Cimw. L. REv. 332.
4. Leagre, The Fourth Amendment and the Law of Arrest, 54 J. Cans. IC. & P.S.
396-98 (1963).
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mately more damaging to the person arrested than the charge filed
or final outcome of the criminal proceedings. To an individual
under arrest, it generally means at least a temporary loss of free-
dom, a damaged reputation,5 and an arrest record which may not
be expungable even if the arrest was illegal.6 These human conse-
quences are in addition to the frightening experience of being com-
pletely subject to the will of another person, usually armed.
In legal terms, the occurrence and moment of an arrest can be
vital factual issues in criminal proceedings, due to the exclusion of
evidence obtained incident to an unlawful arrest.7 Whether proba-
ble cause to arrest existed at the critical moment is the issue gen-
erally raised when the legality of an arrest is challenged.8 For
example, the defense might contend no arrest was made in order
to prevent the prosecution from justifying a disputed search as in-
cident to a lawful arrest. In such a case, the prosecution would
have the burden of proving the occurrence of a lawful arrest. In
other cases, the defense might contend an arrest occurred, but
without probable cause. To escape the burden of proving probable
cause, the prosecution incurs the burden of proving no arrest took
place at the time alleged by the defense.9 The ultimate burden al-
5. For example, for persons residing permanently in a rural area, the commu-
nity will quickly forget or never know a termination of criminal proceedings
favorable to the accused, but will long remember the fact of the arrest if con-
summated publicly. See also W. LAFAVE, supra note 2, at 5; Meyer, Arrest
Under the New Kansas Criminal Code, 20 KAN. L. REV. 685 (1972).
6. Comment, Criminal Procedure: Expungement of Arrest Records, 62 MINN. L.
REV. 229 (1978); Comment, Sealing and Expungement of Criminal Records:
Avoiding the Inevitable Social Stigma, 58 NEB. L. REv. 1087 (1979); Comment,
Arrest Record Expungement-A Function of the Criminal Court, 1971 UTAH L.
REv. 381 (1971). L.B. 450 (1979), dealing in part with expungement of arrest
records, was killed in the 1979 session of the Nebraska Legislature.
7. Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S.
471 (1963); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); State v. Mercurio, 96 R.I. 464, 194
A.2d 574 (1963). Also, without an arrest, the implied consent statute is not
triggered so as to render admissible the results of non-consensual chemical
analyses of blood or urine samples. NEB. REV. STAT. § 39-669.08 (Reissue
1978). See Otte v. State, 172 Neb. 110, 108 N.W.2d 737 (1961).
8. Both the operation of the exclusionary rule and the nature of probable cause
are beyond the scope of this article. Also, while this article is primarily con-
cerned with warrantless arrests, the principles discussed apply as well to ar-
rests supported by warrants.
9. W. RiNGEL, SEARCHES & SEIZURES, ARRESTS AND CONFESSIONS § 346 (1972);
Cook, Varieties of Detention and the Fourth Amendment, 23 ALA. L. REV. 287,
289 (1971).
Whether an arrest occurred, and, if so, whether it was lawful, is not the full
extent of the problems posed in text accompanying notes 7-8 supra. Even
though an arrest did not occur in a given case, a seizure of the person still
may have taken place. Seizures not amounting to arrests are governed by a
different set of rules. Brown v. Texas, 99 S. Ct. 2637 (1979); Dunaway v. New
York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979); Penn-
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ways remains on the state.
Some events are not arrests by virtue of statute. Under Ne-
braska law, a peace officer may take into custody, under specified
conditions, a child under eighteen years of age.' 0 Such custody, by
the terms of the statute, "shall not be deemed an arrest." Also,
under the Nebraska Mental Health Commitment Act, certain per-
sons can be taken into custody with or without issuance of a
mental health board warrant." Mental health custody does not ap-
pear to be an arrest.
According to statutory law in Nebraska, persons found on pub-
lic property in a dangerous, intoxicated state or otherwise incapac-
itated may be taken into custody.12 After reasonable attempts
have been made, without success, to place such persons in pre-
ferred alternative situations, such persons may be held for not
more than twelve hours in civil protective custody. By the terms of
the statute, such custody is not an arrest and no arrest record is to
be made based upon such custody.13
As United States v. Bonanno14 indicates, constitutional analysis
of an arrest/detention case previously focused on the occurrence
of an arrest under traditional principles of arrest law.'5 However,
sylvania v. Mmms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972);
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
10. NEB. Rav. STAT. § 43-205.01 (Reissue 1974).
11. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-1028 (Reissue 1976); §§ 83-1020, 83-1021, 83-1030 (Cum.
Supp. 1978).
The mental health boards do not have the power to issue arrest warrants,
even though they are empowered to issue warrants for the custody of persons
alleged to be mentally ill and dangerous. Id. § 29-403 (Reissue 1975).
12. NEB. REv. STAT. § 53-1,121 (Supp. 1979).
13. LB. 376, § 2(4), ch. -, 1979 Neb. Laws (codified at NEB. REV. STAT. § 53-1,121
(4) (Supp. 1979)).
14. 180 F. Supp. 71 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other grounds sub. nom., U.S. v. Bufalino,
285 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1960).
15. The nature of the definitional problem was highlighted in Bonanno.
It is axiomatic that before a finding can be made that there has
been an illegal arrest, a showing must be made that there has been
an arrest. Thus, an immediate problem of definition arises. Joined to
that problem, is the danger, that the defining process will cast an air
of deceptive simplicity over the broader task actually faced by the
Court. One must never forget that this is a decision on the rights of
individuals and the duties of government, and not an abstract exer-
cise in definition. In dealing with words there is always a temptation
to allow them to become separated from their objective correlatives
in the everyday world, and to treat them as if they have, or ought to
have, one single simple meaning, unaffected by the contexts in which
they occur and divorced from the world of things and events which
give them their content and justification.
'Arrest' is just such a word, not only because it is necessarily un-
specific and descriptive of complex, often extended processes, but
because in different contexts it describes different processes, each of
19801
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in a line of decisions beginning in 1968, the United States Supreme
Court changed the critical inquiry from the occurrence of an arrest
to the occurrence and scope of a seizure of the person. By so do-
ing, the Court has since diluted the significance of the law of arrest
for purposes of constitutional analysis in some types of cases.
In the first of this line of cases, Terry v. Ohio,16 the Court re-
viewed an investigative detention and protective frisk and held the
applicable test was whether the frisk was reasonable, not whether
probable cause existed to support the stop.17 The decision caused
considerable confusion because the Court specifically decided
"[N] othing... concerning the constitutional propriety of an in-
vestigative 'seizure' upon less than probable cause for purposes of
'detention' and/or interrogation. '18
Four years after Terry, the Court reviewed another investiga-
tive detention and protective seizure in Adams v. Williams.19 In
that case the Court held: "a brief stop of a suspicious individual
... may be most reasonable in light of the facts known to the of-
ficer at the time. '20 The Court, without any specific explanation in
Adams, seemed to approve the police practice of stops on less
than probable cause.
In United States v. Robinson,2 1 the Court held it was "the lawful
arrest which establishe[d] the authority to search, . . . [Iln the
case of a lawful custodial arrest a full search of the person is not
only an exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth
Amendment, but is also a 'reasonable' search under that Amend-
ment. '22 By virture of this holding, a lawful arrest establishes
probable cause for any warrantless, full search of the arrestee.
Consequently, the determination of when the arrest took place can
be vitally important in criminal proceedings.
In Dunaway v. New York, 23 the Court required that before po-
lice may detain a suspect for purposes of custodial interrogation,
they must have probable cause to support the detention. The
which has built up, in both legal and common parlance, sharply di-
vergent emotional connotations.
180 F. Supp. at 77.
16. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
17. Id. at 20-21.
18. Id. at 19 n.16.
19. 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
20. Id. at 146. The Nebraska Supreme Court has adopted the holding of Adams v.
Williams. E.g., State v. Irwin, 191 Neb. 169, 214 N.W.2d 595 (1974); State v.
Brewer, 190 Neb. 667, 212 N.W.2d 90 (1973); State v. Brown, 195 Neb. 321, 237
N.W.2d 861 (1976). Even before the Terry decision, Nebraska's Legislature
adopted NEB. Rav. STAT. § 29-829 (Reissue 1975), the "stop and frisk" statute.
21. 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
22. Id. at 235.
23. 442 U.S. 200 (1979).
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Court explained the intended application of its Terry decision and
took the opportunity to review the propriety of investigative
seizures upon less than probable cause for purposes of detention
and interrogation: the issue not decided in Terry. No search is-
sues were presented in Dunaway.
The effect of an unlawful arrest on jurisdiction should also be
noted. It is the rule in almost all American jurisdictions, that
whenever the accused is personally before the court, the court's
jurisdiction is not impaired by the means used to bring the ac-
cused before it.24 This rule seems to apply in most of the readily
imaginable situations (e.g., arrest without probable cause; forcible
return from another state without authority; defective warrants;
stops by local police outside municipal boundaries; etc.) .25 The ra-
tionale supporting this rule is that the only issue in a criminal case
is the guilt or innocence of the accused. The manner of securing
personal jurisdiction of the accused is collateral, and, therefore, ir-
relevant,26 except for possible effects on admissibility of evidence
obtained in violation of the fourth, fifth or sixth amendments.
This article presents and analyzes the various definitions of an
arrest as formulated in several jurisdictions. Furthermore, it fo-
cuses on the law of arrest in Nebraska. Finally, a practical and
sensitive alternative to formal arrest procedure, the citation-in-lieu
of arrest, is examined along with the special problems presented
by the citation procedure.
H. ARREST IN OTHER STATES
A majority of the courts that have considered the question have
agreed upon a set of elements which, when taken together, consti-
tute an arrest: 1) a purpose or intention to effect an arrest; 2) real
or presumed authority; 3) actual or constructive seizure or deten-
tion of the arrestee by a person having present power to control
24. E. FISHER, LAWS OF ARREST 401-03 (1967).
25. See id. at 402-03.
26. State v. Poynter, 70 Idaho 438, 220 P.2d 386 (1950). See Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S.
436 (1886).
Nebraska follows this rule. In State v. Knudsen, 201 Neb. 584, 270 N.W.2d
926 (1978), the Nebraska Supreme Court held the possible illegality of the
arrest was not a defense to the crime for which the arrest was made. Knud-
sen was a driving-while-intoxicated case in which the accused was arrested
outside the Blair city limits by a Blair police officer. Had the case depended
upon the fruits of a search of the arrestee's person or vehicle, the case might
have been decided differently. However, the fourth and fifth amendments
generally have little application to these cases. See State v. Costello, 199 Neb.
43, 256 N.W.2d 97 (1977); State v. Nicholson, 183 Neb. 834, 164 N.W.2d 652
(1969); Maddox v. Sigler, 181 Neb. 690, 150 N.W.2d 251 (1967); Jackson v. Olson,
146 Neb. 885, 22 N.W.2d 124 (1946).
1980]
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the arrestee; 4) communication by the arrestor to the arrestee of
his purpose or intention to make an arrest; and 5) an understand-
ing by the arrestee of the arrestor's intention to then and there
arrest or detain him.27
In applying this elemental approach to actual cases, courts
agreeing on these elements are, nevertheless, hopelessly divergent
on the question of which element or set of elements should be of
controlling importance within a given factual context.
A. The Purposive Approach
The view that the intent or purpose of the officer is the critical,
and possibly the only, factor which determines whether an arrest
has occurred seems to have been legitimated by the United States
Supreme Court in Terry and Adams. It is epitomized by cases and
statutes which state: "[A] n arrest is the taking of a person into
custody in order that he may be held to answer a criminal
charge."2 8
United States v. Bonanno,2 9 was one of the leading pre-Terry
authorities supporting the purposive approach. In Bonanno, the
police officers knew that a meeting was taking place at the estate of
a known syndicate leader. They did not know the purpose of the
meeting. Nevertheless, the police set up a roadblock on a public
road leading from the estate. They then stopped every unfamiliar
car using the road in order to identify the occupants. Nearly every-
one so identified was asked to report to a nearby police station. All
who reported were questioned for periods not exceeding half an
hour. The ultimate issue was the admissibility of statements made
by the defendants during their period of detention. The court
stated:
27. Range v. State, 156 So. 2d 534 (Fla. App. 1963); Clements v. State, 226 Ga. 66,
172 S.E.2d 600 (1970); State v. Loyd, 92 Idaho 20, 435 P.2d 797 (1967); People v.
Jackson, 98 Ill. App. 2d 238, 240 N.E.2d 421 (1968); State v. MacKenzie, 161 Me.
123, 210 A.2d 24 (1965); People v. Woods, 16 Mich. App. 718, 168 N.W.2d 617
(1969); State v. District Court, 70 Mont. 378, 225 P. 1000 (1924); State v. Terry, 5
Ohio App. 2d 122, 214 N.E.2d 114 (1966); Hoppes v. State, 70 Okla. Crim. 179,
105 P.2d 433 (1940).
28. State v. Glick, 87 S.D. 1, 201 N.W.2d 867 (1972); Range v. State, 156 So. 2d 534
(Fla. App. 1963). See UNIFORM ARREST ACT § 1 (1942) [hereinafter cited as
UAA]; ALI MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 110.2, Note
(P.O.D. No. 1, 1972) [hereinafter cited as ALI CODE]; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11,
§ 1901 (1974); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 59411 (1974); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-7-1
(1969).
29. 180 F. Supp. 71 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
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It is clear that a technical arrest demands an intent on the part of the ar-
resting officer to bring in a person so that he might be put through the
steps preliminary to answering for a crime such as fingerprinting, booking,
arraigning, etc.... The common conception of an arrest, like the techni-
cal definition, comprehends the formal charging with a crime.
3 0
The court then concluded the fourth amendment was not violated
by the police actions, because "it cannot be contended that every
detention of an individual" 31 is a seizure in the fourth amendment
sense.
Were the Bonanno definition of an arrest applied literally, any
detention, irrespective of its reasonableness, would be constitu-
tionally valid so long as the police officer would testify he had no
intention of initiating criminal charges against the detainee until
probable cause could be obtained.3 2 Further, if the intent of the
police officer is the controlling factor, then the Constitution and
the courts are supplanted by the police officer in the field as the
protectors of the peoples' liberty.3 3 Unfortunately, the Bonanno
definition of an arrest has been persuasive to a number of courts,
including the Nebraska Supreme Court.3
At the time of the Bonanno decision, there was at least inferen-
tial support for the position that the officer's purpose or intent is
the dispositive factor. In Henry v. United States,35 the F.B.I. was
investigating the theft of an interstate shipment of whiskey. The
agents had received information implicating one of the defendants.
The agents followed the defendants' car after it left a tavern. De-
fendants eventually parked in an alley. One of the defendants left
the car and returned carrying some cartons, which he put in the
car. The car left the alley and eluded the agents. Later, the agents
again found the car parked in front of the tavern. Defendants left
the tavern and again drove to the alley. Again, one of the defend-
ants left the car and returned with some cartons. This time, after
defendants left the alley, the agents stopped the car and searched
it. Finding an out-of-state address on the cartons, the agents took
the defendants into custody and held them for approximately two
hours. During this period, the agents discovered stolen radios in
the suspect cartons and then formally arrested the defendants.3 6
Rather than contesting the time of the arrest, the prosecution
conceded the arrest occurred when defendants' car was stopped,
30. Id. at 77-78.
31. Id. at 78.
32. Cook, Subjective Attitudes of Arrestee and Arrestor as Affecting Occurrence of
Arrest, 19 KAN. L. REV. 173, 181 (1971).
33. Foote, The Fourth Amendment: Obstacle or Necessity in the Law ofArrest?, 51
J. Camm. L.C. & P.S. 402, 404 (1960).
34. State v. Carpenter, 181 Neb. 639, 150 N.W.2d 129 (1967).
35. 361 U.S. 98 (1959).
36. Id. at 100.
1980]
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and argued the probable cause issue.37 The issue before the
Supreme Court was whether, at the time the defendants' car was
stopped, the agents had probable cause to arrest. The Supreme
Court decided they did not.
In view of the government's concession, the Court could state
nothing binding about the moment of arrest. The Court did, how-
ever, state that in its opinion, "when the officers interrupted the
two men and restricted their liberty of movement, the arrest, for
purposes of this case, was complete."3 8 That statement reveals lit-
tle. The Court could have been indicating agreement with the the-
ory that any restraint is an arrest.3 9 Having thus commented on
the question, the Court left the impression it would have decided
the question that way had the prosecution not conceded the is-
sue.4°
In Rios v. United States,4 1 state police officers were patrolling a
neighborhood known for its narcotics activity. Upon observing the
defendant, who was not previously known to the officers, enter a
taxi, the officers followed for two miles. At a traffic light, the of-
ficers got out of their car and approached the cab on opposite sides.
Alarmed, the defendant dropped a package, recognizable to the of-
ficers as a package of narcotics. The officers tried unsuccessfully
to stop the defendant's escape into an alley, but stopped him by
shooting him in the back.42 The officers testified that they had not
been investigating any particular crime and did not intend to ar-
rest the defendant up to the point of approaching the cab.43 They
simply wanted to question him.
The Supreme Court found there was no probable cause for an
arrest up to the point of the initial encounter. 4 In this case, the
government chose to contest the issue of the time at which the ar-
rest occurred. The Supreme Court did not decide the question, but
remanded to the district court for a determination.45
Henry and Rios can be distinguished only on the inferences
flowing from the manner of the officers' approaches to the defend-
ants. In Henry, the officers believed they had probable cause and
approached the defendants' car with pistols drawn, which indi-
37. Id. at 103.
38. Id.
39. See note 47 infra.
40. Cook, supra note 9, at 292.
41. 364 U.S. 253 (1960).
42. Id. at 256 n.1.
43. Id. at 262.
44. Id.
45. The district court found, on remand, that the officers' approach to the cab did
not constitute an arrest. United States v. Rios, 192 F. Supp. 888 (S.D. Cal.
1961).
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cated their intent. In Rios, the officers knew they had nothing and
testified they did not intend an arrest. The difference in the deci-
sions appears to have been based upon the difference in the of-
ficers' intentions.48
1. Terry v. Ohio47
In Terry, a plainclothes detective assigned to a downtown patrol
observed two men looking into a store window. The men walked to
a street corner and stopped to talk. Subsequently, the men took
turns walking past the same store, stopping on each pass to look
into the window. A third man arrived at the corner and talked with
the men. He then walked quickly away. The two continued look-
ing at the store, until they left to rejoin the third man.4 8
After witnessing this ritual the detective became suspicious.
He approached the three men, identified himself and asked their
names. One of the men, Terry, mumbled something. The detective
grabbed Terry, spun him around and patted down his outer cloth-
ing. The detective felt a pistol in Terry's left breast pocket which
he took into his possession. Terry and one of his companions were
charged with carrying concealed weapons.49
The Supreme Court did not determine the propriety of the ini-
tial intrusion, 0 but considered the issue to be "[w] hether it is al-
ways unreasonable for a policeman to seize a person and subject
him to a limited search for weapons unless there is probable cause
for an arrest."5 1 The Court applied the traditional balancing test to
rule the limited search lawful.
In justifying the particular intrusion the police officer must be able to
point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational
inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion...52
46. Cook, supra note 32, at 181.
47. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
48. Id. at 6.
49. Id. at 7.
50. Id. at 19 n.16. Chief Justice Warren limited the focus of the Court's decision:
We thus decide nothing today concerning the constitutional propri-
ety of an investigative 'seizure' upon less than probable cause for
purposes of 'detention' and/or interrogation. Obviously, not all per-
sonal intercourse between policemen and citizens involves 'seizures'
of persons. Only when the officer, by means of physical force or show
of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citi-en may
we conclude that a 'seizure' has occurred. We cannot tell with any
certainty upon this record whether any such 'seizure' took place here
prior to Officer McFadden's initiation of physical contact for pur-
poses of searching Terry for weapons, and we thus may assume that
up to that point no intrusion upon constitutionally protected rights
had occurred.
51. Id. at 15.
52. Id. at 21.
1980]
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The officer need not be absolutely certain that the individual is armed; the
issue is whether a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be
warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in dan-
ger...53
[WIhere a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him rea-
sonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be
afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and
presently dangerous, . . he is entitled for the protection of himself and
others.., to conduct a carefully limited search... to discover weapons
54
The Court concerned itself with the reasonableness and scope of
the additional intrusion, the pat down, rather than the reasonable-
ness of the initial intrusion.
The same balancing test could have been used to justify the
stop if framed in terms of the officer's purpose or intent to prevent
crime as opposed to an intent to apprehend a criminal. The gov-
ernmental interest of crime prevention and detection was alluded
to by the Court as underlying "the recognition that a police officer
may in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner
approach a person for purposes of investigating possibly criminal
behavior even though there is no probable cause to make an ar-
rest.,55
The Court, in Terry, also made several particularly relevant re-
marks, similar to language used in Bonanno:
It is quite plain that the Fourth Amendment governs 'seizures' of the
person which do not eventuate in a trip to the station house and prosecu-
tion for crime--'arrests' in traditional terminology. It must be recognized
that whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his free-
dom to walk away, he has 'seized' that person 5 6 ...
A seizure occurs whenever an 'officer' by means of physical force or
show of authority, .... in some way restrain(s) the liberty of a citizen 5 7
An arrest is the initial stage of a criminal prosecution. It is intended to
vindicate society's interest in having its laws obeyed, and it is inevitably
accompanied by future interference with the individual's freedom of
movement, whether or not trial or conviction ultimately follows.
5 8
The Court seemed to distinguish a field detention or investiga-
tive stop from an arrest on the basis of the officer's purpose or in-
tent. Reasonableness, not probable cause, was sufficient to justify
the stop. Even though the stop/arrest distinction was purely dic-
53. Id. at 27.
54. Id. at 30.
55. Id. at 22.
56. Id. at 16.
57. Id. at 19 n.16 (cited and rephrased in Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 116
n.2 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
58. Id. at 26.
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tum, the distinction carried the symbolic support of the majority of
the Court.59
It should be noted that Justice Harlan, in his concurring opin-
ion, indicated that the limited search was justifiable only if the ini-
tial forcible stop was lawful. 60 He believed the conclusion that the
stop was justified was necessarily implied in the majority opinion
on the facts presented. In his view, a police officer could not law-
fully conduct a protective search if he had contributed to the dan-
gerous situation by his own action in making an unlawful stop.61
2. Adams v. Williams62
In Adams, a police officer patrolling a high crime area during
the early morning hours was given a tip by an anonymous in-
former, to the effect that Williams, the defendant, was sitting in a
car carrying narcotics and had a gun at his waist. The officer ap-
proached Williams' car, tapped on the window and asked Williams
to open the door. Williams responded by rolling down the window,
at which time the officer immediately reached inside the car and
grabbed the gun from Williams' waistband. The officer could not
see the gun from outside the car.63 Notwithstanding this, the
Court held the seizure of the gun permissible under Terry in order
to protect the officer. When the gun proved to be where the in-
former said it would be, the officer had probable cause for the sub-
sequent arrest.64
The Court held that under Terry, a police officer is constitution-
ally authorized to insist upon an encounter with a citizen despite
the absence of probable cause to believe that a crime has been or
is being committed.65 Apparently, the Adams majority accepted
the views of Justice Harlan in Terry that the legality of the initial
stop was implicitly upheld by the Terry majority on the facts
presented in that case.66
Through its decisions in Terry and Adams, the Supreme Court
obscured whatever understanding there once may have been as to
the meaning of the word "seizure" by supporting a distinction be-
tween an arrest and an investigative detention. The problem is
that the Court emphasized the purpose or intent of the officer in
59. Id. at 20-27.
60. Id. at 33.
61. Id. at 33-34. See Young v. United States, 435 F.2d 405 (D.C. Cir. 1970). But see
United States v. Nicholas, 448 F.2d 622 (8th Cir. 1971).
62. 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
63. Id. at 145.
64. Id. at 148.
65. Id. at 146-7.
66. Id.
1980]
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upholding the stops in Terry and Adams on something less than
probable cause. By that emphasis, the Court may have changed
the general law of arrest by setting up the officer's intent, revealed
after the fact in his testimony, as the most important element of an
arrest. Perhaps the Court was asserting that the only time an ar-
rest occurs is when the suspect is actually taken in. 67 In like fash-
ion, the Court has not indicated whether the duration of the
"seizure" is a significant factor in determining whether an arrest
has occurred. The passage of time considered alone, is, after all, an
arbitrary measurement.
3. Dunaway v. New York 68
Some of the conceptual problems created by the Terry and
Adams decisions have been solved and replaced by new problems
as a result of the decision in Dunaway v. New York. 69 In Duna-
way, the arresting officers admitted they lacked probable cause for
an arrest. Nevertheless, they subdued Dunaway at a neighbor's
house, took him to police headquarters and questioned him in an
interrogation room after giving him his Miranda70 warnings.7 1
Dunaway's trip to the station house was involuntary. He was not
told he was under arrest, nor was he told he was free to go. In fact,
he would have been physically restrained had he refused to ac-
company the officers or had he tried to escape their custody.7 2 The
Court said:
[T]he detention of petitioner was in important respects indistinguishable
from a traditional arrest .... The application of the Fourth Amendment's
requirement of probable cause does not depend on whether an intrusion
of this magnitude is termed an 'arrest' under state law. The mere facts
that petitioner was not told he was under arrest, was not 'booked,' and
would not have had an arrest record if the interrogation had proved fruit-
less, while not insignificant for all purposes,... obviously do not make
petitioner's seizure even roughly analogous to the narrowly defined intru-
sions involved in Terry and its progeny.73
The Dunaway Court rejected the use of the Terry balancing test
and required probable cause for the seizure. The balancing test
was reserved for intrusions falling "far short of the kind of intru-
sion associated with an arrest."74
While the Court still considered the subjective intent of the of-
ficers and their purpose in effecting the seizure, the Court appears
67. Meyer, supra note 5, at 734.
68. 442 U.S. 200 (1979).
69. Id.
70. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
71. 442 U.S. at 203.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 212-13.
74. Id. at 212.
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to have considered these factors as nothing more than supporting
considerations. The scope of the intrusions involved in this line of
decisions75 now appears to have been the primary inquiry, not the
purpose or intent of the officers. However, these decisions are all
fourth amendment seizure cases wherein the occurrence of a
seizure is the critical fact, not the occurrence of an arrest, except
where a purported search incident to arrest was being reviewed.
Even so, the scope of the intrusion concept could be useful in de-
termining whether an arrest has occurred.
B. The Understanding of the Arrestee
The United States Supreme Court has not acknowledged the
role of the arrestee or the importance of his or her attitude as it
relates to the arrest situation.76 However, a cogent argument
based upon the history of the fourth amendment has been made
indicating that perhaps the attitude of the arrestee should be an
important factor in determining whether an arrest has occurred.77
Historically, the English colonial administration subjected the
colonies to a strictly enforced system of trade restriction. As part
of the enforcement program, the English customs officials made
extensive use of the writs of assistance, which, due to a lack of a
specified time for return, were in substance general warrants of
unlimited legal duration. No sworn factual showing was necessary
to obtain such a writ. With writ in hand, a customs officer could
search at will any house during daytime hours and any ship, any
time, for unspecified goods, wares and merchandise. 78 The colo-
nists not only demonstrated against the use of writs of assistance,
but also complained to the Crown in the 1772 Petition of the Colo-
nial Congress to the King.79 The arbitrary power of the customs
officials acting under authority of the writs of assistance was con-
sidered as one of the basic violations of colonial rights.8 0
After the Revolution and the passage of time during which the
75. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979); Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106
(1977); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976); United States v.
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972);
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
76. The Court has, however, dealt at length with the feelings and understanding
of the detainee for purposes of fourth amendment analysis in motor vehicle
stop cases. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979); United States v. Mar-
tinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873
(1975). See also Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977).
77. Abrams, Constitutional Limitations on Detention for Investigation, 52 IowA
L REv. 1093 (1967).
78. Id. at 1098.
79. Id. at 1099.
80. Id.
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failure of the Articles of Confederation had become apparent, the
Constitutional Convention assembled.81 The Convention had
available to it several examples of bills of rights in the states' con-
stitutions, but chose to seek ratification of the new constitution
without a bill of rights. This omission formed a central argument
of the anti-Federalists against adoption of the proposed Constitu-
tion.82 The danger of arbitrary arrest, searches pursuant to general
warrants and searches pursuant to warrants not based upon sworn
testimony were mentioned as some of the specific incidents of tyr-
anny not precluded by the proposed constitution. A popular pam-
phlet of the day declared: "The rights of individuals ought to be
the primary object of all government, and cannot be too securely
guarded by the most explicit declarations .... ",83
This statement was directed toward what the pamphleteer la-
beled subjection to "the insolence of any petty revenue officer to
enter our houses, search, insult and seize at pleasure. ' 84 Similarly,
a major concern of the framers of the Bill of Rights seems to have
been the prevention of arbitrary police powers committed to the
discretion of the enforcing officers.85 The framers were concerned
with the rights of individuals, rather than providing for the "needs
of law enforcement" due to the abuses perpetrated under that ban-
ner.
At least one contemporary authority adheres to this philoso-
phy:
[I]f the policeman's conduct presents ambiguity as to the existence of a
restraint, then the state of mind of the individual is controlling. This is a
sound approach, for it is the citizen's right to be protected from intrusion
which is forbidden by the fourth amendment. If he believes that he is in
custody, then all of the legal protections that flow from that consequence
should be his.
It might be argued that rather than considering the subjective state of
mind of the individual, an objective, reasonable man test should be em-
ployed. Proponents of this test argue that the police will be intolerably
burdened if they have to guess what is in every foolish or irrational mind.
However, the Bill of Rights was enacted to protect every man and al-
though the police may be burdened from time to time, the subjective test
seems appropriate and required.8 6
The American Law Institute apparently adopted this approach
in its proposed Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure. 8 7 The
Code provides that where a police officer has assumed control over
81. Id. at 1100.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1100 (quoting FORD, PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSrrTLON OF THE UNrrED
STATES 12-13 (1888)).
84. Abrams, supra note 77.
85. Id. at 1100-01.
86. Abrams, supra note 64, at 1103-04 (footnotes omitted).
87. All CODE, supra note 28.
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a person other than by the authority of or for the time permitted by
the Code's investigative detention provisions, then the restrained
person is entitled to all the protections afforded a formally arrested
person.88 The specified acts of the officer which would trigger the
operation of this provision are: an indication by a specific order or
by the officer's conduct that the person is obliged to remain in the
officer's presence when no such obligation exists; or, a failure by
the officer to inform such a detained person that he is free to go.89
At least one state court of last resort has accepted the theory
forwarded by the ALT. In Huebner v. State,90 the defendant was
convicted of a sex crime. He contended his arrest was not based
on probable cause and that the inculpatory statements he made at
the police station were inadmissible because he had not been ad-
vised of his constitutional rights. The day after the crime was com-
mitted, a police officer stopped defendant's car because it matched
a description given the police. The officer, after learning defendant
had used his car the preceding night, asked defendant to come to
the police station for further questioning. The defendant was not
told he was under arrest, nor was he ordered to appear. He drove
his own car to the station. He did not understand himself to be
under arrest, his liberty was not restricted and the officer testified
that he had no intention of restraining the defendant. 91 The Wis-
88. Id. § 120.5(1).
89. The drafters of the Code felt section 120.5 was "necessary to make clear that
the Code's protective provisions for arrested persons are applicable, whether
or not the assumption of custody over the person was legal, or constituted an
arrest in the mind of the officer." Id. at 145 (commentary).
Section 120.5(2) deals with situations arising where a police officer has re-
quested "a person to come to or remain at a police station, prosecutor's office,
or other similar place," and has failed to "take such steps as are reasonable
under the circumstances to make clear that", id. § 120.5(2), such person is
under no legal obligation to comply with such a request. Where such situa-
tions arise, the Code conclusively presumes that such a person, if he com-
plies with the officer's request, proceeds under compulsion and is therefore
entitled to all the protections afforded a formally arrested person.
As a rationale for section 120.5(2), the Code drafters state:
The practical significance of the safeguards provided for in-custody
investigation would be greatly undermined if it were open to the po-
lice to contend that none of those safeguards applied since the ac-
cused had appeared and remained at the police station voluntarily,
although the accused may not have known that he was not under
constraint.
Id. at 145. Should the police violate section 120.5, the exclusionary rule is to
be applied to any statements or other evidence obtained by such violation. It
should be noted the effect of section 120.5 is intended to be limited such that
"the person involved is not to be deemed to have been arrested for any pur-
pose other than invoking the protective provisions of ... this Code." Id. at
21.
90. 33 Wis. 2d 505, 147 N.W.2d 646 (1967).
91. Id. at 516, 147 N.W.2d at 651.
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consin Supreme Court held the stopping of the car followed by the
questioning at the police station did not constitute an arrest be-
cause the facts did not show an intent on the part of the officers to
arrest the defendant, nor an understanding by the defendant that
he was under arrest.92
In its concern for the power of the police legally to detain for
investigation, the court admonished that despite that power.
It must be made plain to the person he is not under arrest and there is no
legal obligation to comply with the request to appear at the station, and
the act of the person must be voluntary and uncoerced. However, if the
law enforcement officer by order or conduct indicates the person is
obliged to remain in the officer's presence or to come to the [police] sta-
tion, such person is for practical purposes arrested because of the imposi-
tion of the will of the police officer over the freedom of the person....
The same result is reached by a voluntary submission to [such] cus-
tody.9 3
Most of the courts faced with this problem have held an arrest
is not effected when the suspect consents to accompany a police
officer to the station or another place. 94 Such decisions seem to be
based on the idea that an arrest can occur only when the individual
is detained against his will. If an individual consented to accom-
pany the officer, then the coercive element is absent.95
Dupree v. United States96 is illustrative of situations in which
the events take place so quickly that isolating the first moment of
the arrest is very difficult. Upon seeing the defendant walking late
at night in a recently burglarized area, police officers stopped to
question him. Both officers were out of their car when Dupree was
asked if he was carrying a weapon. Dupree abruptly stepped back,
reaching for his right coat pocket. One of the officers immediately
grabbed him by the arm, while the other drew his revolver. One of
the officers then removed a revolver and formally arrested Dupree
for carrying a concealed weapon.97
The defense contended the arrest was illegal because it took
place when Dupree was first detained, before there was probable
cause to support an arrest. Citing Schook v. United States98 for the
proposition that "arrest connotes restraint," the court held that
"[m] ere questioning absent a submissive feeling of forced deten-
tion does not constitute an arrest."99 Accordingly, the weapon was
admissible as the fruit of a search incident to a valid arrest, since
92. Id. at 516-17, 147 N.W.2d at 652.
93. Id. at 516, 147 N.W.2d at 651.
94. See notes 96-120 & accompanying text infra.
95. Cook, supra note 32, at 177.
96. 380 F.2d 233 (8th Cir. 1967).
97. Id. at 234.
98. 337 F.2d 563, 566 (8th Cir. 1964).
99. 380 F.2d at 235.
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"[e]very officer has the right to arrest and make search when he
feels his life is in danger."'100 The court completely overlooked the
fact that the officers had contributed to the danger to themselves
by stopping appellant and inexplicably inquiring whether he was
carrying a weapon. 0 1 The court's rationale in Dupree was nothing
more than bootstrapping.
In State v. MacKenzie,0 2 the Maine Supreme Court held that
the belief of the detained person as to whether he was under arrest
was "not controlling."'1 03 MacKenzie arguably understood that he
was under arrest because the police had handcuffed his compan-
ion and told him to come along. However, no arrest occurred ac-
cording to the court, since the police had not physically detained
the defendant. The court ignored the effect of voluntary submis-
sion.
The MacKenzie decision raises the questions of how much re-
straint is necessary to give the "arrestee" a reasonable basis for
believing himself arrested, whether the police must formally an-
nounce their intention to arrest, and how such an announcement
relates to the arrestee's understanding of his situation. Generally,
no formal declaration of arrest nor any actual application of physi-
cal force is required. If the officer's conduct clearly implies his
purpose or intent to arrest, any announcement would be superflu-
ous,1 04 except for evidentiary purposes. This general rule is based
upon the premises that intent can be manifested by conduct, 0 5
and that the purpose of the announcement is to make the officer's
intent unquestionably clear. Consequently, if the arrestee chooses
not to cooperate, he cannot later complain that he did not realize
his failure to cooperate risked any physical or legal reprisals. 0 6
The arrestor's announcement or lack thereof can have interesting
results.
In People v. Woods, 0 7 the question before the court was not the
legality of the arrest, but whether an arrest had occurred prior to a
fatal shooting for purposes of a felony murder conviction. Woods
had been involved in a barroom disturbance during which he fired
100. Id.
101. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 31-34 (Harlan, J., concurring).
102. 161 Me. 123, 210 A.2d 24 (1965).
103. Id. at 138-39, 210 A.2d at 33.
104. Miles v. Commonwealth, 8 Pa. Commw. Ct 544, 304 A.2d 704 (1973); Cook,
supra note 32, at 174. However, the right to use force in effecting an arrest
may depend upon whether a formal declaration has been made under NEB.
REV. STAT. § 28-1412(2) (a) (Cum. Supp. 1978).
105. People v. Ruiz, 265 Cal. App. 2d 766,71 Cal. Rptr. 519 (1968); State v. Contursi,
44 N.J. 422, 209 A.2d 829 (1965).
106. See Pullins v. State, 253 Ind. 644, 256 N.E.2d 553 (1970).
107. 16 Mich. App. 718, 168 N.W.2d 617 (1969).
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a pistol into the floor. The police arrived at the scene after Woods
had gone home. They went to his home, surrounded the house and
demanded he surrender his gun. He offered to come out, but re-
fused to turn over his gun. As the police entered the house, Woods
shot and killed one of the entering officers.' 0 8
The defense contended Woods was not under arrest at the time
of the shooting. Therefore, he could be convicted of manslaughter
but not first degree murder.109 The Michigan Court of Appeals
held "defendant knew and acknowledged that the police were in
pursuit of him. This was sufficient coercion albeit not manual
seizure to constitute lawful arrest."1 0 Under the facts in Woods, it
was clear that the defendant was not confused as to his status.
The combination of the police surrounding the house, their de-
mands for surrender, and the defendant's knowledge of the intent
and purpose of the police clearly fit within the general rule.
In contrast to Woods, is People v. Jackson,"' where the precise
issue was "whether the officers' pronouncement of an intention to
arrest, as presumably understood by defendant, was sufficient to
effectuate his arrest . "... 1112 The police had announced their in-
tention to arrest Jackson from a distance of ten to twelve feet.
Jackson was on a public sidewalk and took flight, disposing of
some incriminating evidence as he fled. The court distinguished
these facts from an earlier decision in People v. Pruitt,113 where
the officer's announcement in a close confrontation, coupled with
the arrestee's submission, was held to have constituted an arrest
at the moment of the announcement and submission. The Jackson
court, on the other hand, emphasized that the officers had not
brandished any weapons and that no actual or constructive re-
straint was achieved until later. The officer's proclamation was
characterized as a communication of "mere naked words of inten-
tion."114 The court held: "[B]y his resisting efforts, defendant had
thus remained free from the power of control intended to be exer-
cised by the authorities, without which element he cannot be
heard to submit that his arrest had been made.""15
The Jackson decision might seem to represent a narrow, minor-
ity viewpoint based upon distinctions concerning the distance sep-
arating arrestor and arrestee. However, the fact that the defendant
did appear to have the physical capability of escape by simple
108. Id. at 719, 168 N.W.2d at 617.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 720, 168 N.W.2d at 618.
111. 98 Ill. App. 2d 238, 240 N.E.2d 421 (1968).
112. Id. at 244, 240 N.E.2d at 424.
113. 79 IIl. App. 2d 209, 223 N.E.2d 537 (1967).
114. 98 Ill. App. 2d at 245, 240 N.E.2d at 425.
115. Id. at 245-46, 240 N.E.2d at 425.
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flight, may serve as a valid basis for a distinction. As a result, in
circumstances similar to that in Jackson, it might be unreasonable
to hold that an arrest could occur in the absence of a present abil-
ity on the part of the officer to effectuate the officer's intent, or, at
least, such an ability in the belief of the arrestee.
Overemphasizing the role of the arrestor's intent or purpose to
the exclusion of the knowledge or understanding of the arrestee
can lead to questionable results, as evidenced by State v. Hut-
ton.116 In Hutton, the defendants were riding in a taxi. After stop-
ping the taxi, a police officer told the driver in private to drive to
the police station while the officer followed. In the event the de-
fendants asked why, the driver was instructed to tell them he had
been stopped for a traffic violation. The court held the officer's con-
versation with the driver and the driver's compliance with the of-
ficer's request could not possibly constitute an arrest because
there was nothing to show that the defendants were under the of-
ficer's control or had submitted to his control.117 The court felt de-
fendants were under arrest only after the cab arrived at the police
station. At that time, one of the defendants was locked in a cell
and the other was held in a room with five policemen. At that
point, the court determined the defendants must have known or
understood themselves to have been under restraint"18 and that
the officer intended to arrest defendants only after their arrival at
the station.
Because deception was involved, the defendants had no way of
knowing their status during the drive to the station, but the court
failed to recognize the parallel between this situation and that of
an unconscious arrestee. Unless the arrestee is conscious of his
status, there can be no submission to arrest. Where there is no
seizure of the arrestee's person his understanding should assume
controlling importance.1 9 In Hutton, there was at least a construc-
tive seizure. The driver was acting as the agent of the officer and
was under the control of the officer to that extent.
The general rule is that an inividual is not under arrest if he has
no knowledge or reason to know he is under arrest. 20 The New
Hampshire Supreme Court apparently felt Hutton presented a
proper case in which to apply the general rule. One exception to
this general rule has been developed to meet the special situation
of the unconscious arrestee.
116. 108 N.H. 279, 235 A.2d 117 (1967).
117. Id. at 286, 235 A.2d at 122.
118. Id.
119. E. FSHER, supra note 24, at 52.
120. Schindelar v. Michaud, 411 F.2d 80 (10th Cir. 1969); Harrer v. Montgomery
Ward Co., 124 Mont. 295, 221 P.2d 428 (1950).
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1. Unconscious Arrestee
An unconscious person presents a special situation, because an
unconscious person lacks any present ability to understand his
status. Further, an unconscious person lacks the ability to approve
or deny a proposed search of his person. Generally the essential
element of the arrestee's understanding is missing whenever an
officer seeks to arrest an unconscious person. Without a special
rule to deal with the situation of an unconscious person, there
could be no warrantless search of an unconscious individual inci-
dent to a lawful arrest, because there could be no arrest. Further,
unless such a person can be arrested, which some courts deem es-
sential to the admissibility of body fluid specimen test results, 121
then no samples could be obtained validly, because no consent
could be given.
In Virgin Islands v. Quinones,122 defendant Quinones had been
knocked unconscious in a traffic accident and taken to a hospital,
along with the other driver, defendant Washington. At the direc-
tion of a police officer, a blood sample was taken from each defend-
ant. An analysis of the samples was used at trial. The question of
whether an arrest had occurred was important because of a statute
declaring evidence of blood alcohol content admissible if taken
within two hours of the time of arrest. The reviewing court felt
both defendants were under arrest at the time the samples were
taken.123 The court's reasoning was that had Quinones regained
consciousness and attempted to leave, the investigating officer
would have restrained him.124
121. The issue has not been decided squarely in Nebraska. However, Otte v.
State, 172 Neb. 110, 108 N.W.2d 737 (1961), shows a definite leaning. See
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966); Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432
(1957); Mercer v. State, 256 Ark. 814, 510 S.W.2d 539 (1974); Carrington v. Supe-
rior Court, 31 Cal. App. 3d 635, 107 Cal. Rptr. 546 (1973); People v. Kokesh, 175
Colo. 206, 486 P.2d 429 (1971); State v. Austin, 282 So. 2d 711 (La. 1973); State v.
Mangels, 166 Mont. 190, 531 P.2d 1313 (1975); State v. Cram, 176 Or. 577, 160
P.2d 283 (1945); Scales v. State, 64 Wis. 2d 485, 219 N.W.2d 286 (1974). See also
State v. Rocheleau, 117 N.H. 792, 378 A.2d 1381 (1977); Virgin Islands v. Qui-
nones, 301 F. Supp. 246 (D.V.I. 1969).
122. 301 F. Supp. 246 (D.VI. 1969).
123. [E]ven though defendant Quinones was unconscious and defendant
Washington was in a drunken stupor from the time the officer arrived
at the hospital throughout the proceedings that followed that night,
there is no problem in finding that both men were under arrest from
the moment the police investigator arrived at the hospital. From that
moment on, having been identified as the drivers in the accident
under investigation, both men were in the custody and control of the
police.
Id. at 249.
124. I&
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In Bouldin v. State,125 the defendant was injured in an accident
while driving a motorcycle. Bouldin was conscious enough at the
scene to ask an ambulance attendant to give him a flight bag which
was lying in the street. The investigating officer heard Bouldin's
request for the bag. Later, when the officer arrived at the hospital
intending to arrest Bouldin, whose identity the officer did not yet
know, Bouldin was unconscious. The bag and Bouldin's clothes
were on a shelf beneath his stretcher. The officer searched Boul-
din's jacket and bag and found a large quantity of heroin. Bouldin
was then placed under twenty-four hour guard at the hospital. The
issue was whether the officer had arrested Bouldin prior to the
search.126
The court noted that the officer said and did nothing to indicate
to any of the hospital personnel that he was arresting Bouldin
prior to the search. The first indication given that Bouldin was in
custody was the posting of the guard, after the search. 127 The state
argued that the officer's subjective intention to arrest and his vis-
ual contact with Bouldin as he lay on the stretcher were enough to
constitute an arrest. Rejecting this argument, the court held:
[TI o consummate an arrest of [such] an individual [unconscious person],
there must be an objective manifestation of acts or words unequivocally
showing that an arrest is being made, that the arrestee is being detained
or restrained, and his person brought within the custody and control of the
law. A ritualistic touching is hardly required in such circumstances...
nor is communication of the fact of arrest to an unconscious person either
possible or prerequisite .... [T] he requisite detention of his person may
be effectuated without force or without any physical restraint, so long as
the acts or conduct of the arrestor sufficiently demonstrate that the arres-
tee is within his power or control.128
The court felt the element of detention in arresting an unconscious
person, rather than the technical prerequisites to arrest, should be
emphasized.12 9 It formulated an objective test in Bouldin and em-
phatically rejected the notion that the arrestor's knowledge and in-
tention should alone be determinative of the arrest of unconscious
persons.130 Rather than the knowledge of the arrestee, the knowl-
edge of anyone other than the arrestee who is or could have been
present becomes the crucial element in arrests of unconscious per-
sons-a sort of vicarious knowledge requirement.
In Scales v. State,13' the arresting officer did manifest, by his
acts and conduct, his intention to arrest an unconscious person.
125. 276 Md. 511, 350 A.2d 130 (1976).
126. Id. at 515, 350 A.2d at 132.
127. Id. at 519, 350 A.2d at 134.
128. Id. at 518, 350 A.2d at 134.
129. Id. at 519, 350 A.2d at 135.
130. Id.
131. 64 Wis. 2d 485, 219 N.W.2d 286 (1974).
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The officer was present in the emergency room when Scales, se-
verely injured, was brought in following a traffic accident. The of-
ficer asked Scales his name, but received no reply. Not knowing
whether Scales was conscious or unconscious, the officer issued
two citations, one for driving while intoxicated and one for not hav-
ing a valid driver's license. He placed the citations on Scales'
chest, believing he had thereby arrested Scales. He then directed
the taking of a blood sample. 132
The Wisconsin Supreme Court, without elaboration, held that
this action did constitute an arrest.133 The court seems to have re-
lied upon the officer's intent; however, the opinion can only be sup-
ported by the issuance of the citations coupled with the officer's
intent. Further, the citing officer and two fellow officers stayed to
interrogate Scales after he was treated. Under these circum-
stances, no reasonable observer could have believed Scales was
not under the officer's control.'3
One authority states that an unconscious arrestee's under-
standing of his situation is simply delayed until he regains con-
sciousness. Sufficient understanding is presumed when he
recovers and '"inds himself handcuffed, in jail or perhaps confined
to a hospital room with a policeman standing guard over him."' 35
Therefore, an unconscious person may be arrested when his body
is actually seized and restrained.136 Stating the rule so simply
without mention of the need for acts or conduct clearly showing
the arrestor's intention, risks misunderstanding. The arrestee's
understanding is delayed, but the arrestor must do something that
will provide objective evidence of his intentions, so that the arres-
tee's rights may be protected and insured by subsequent judicial
review. Insistence on such objective evidence will guard against
ex parte arrests, a concept "chilling in its implication and absurd
in its application."' 37
With the sole exception of the unconscious arrestee (which ex-
ception should extend to any case involving a person lacking
mental capacity to understand his situation) the majority rule with
respect to the importance and role of the arrestee's understanding
remains "the time and place of arrest cannot be based solely upon
132. Id. at 488, 219 N.W.2d at 289.
133. Id. at 490, 219 N.W.2d at 290.
134. Id. at 492, 219 N.W.2d at 291.
135. E. FISHER, supra note 24, at 53.
136. Id.
137. Yam Sang Kwai v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 411 F.2d 683, 686
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 877 (1969). One court was able to review the
facts and insure the arrestee's rights by holding arrest of an unconscious per-
son impossible. Carrington v. Superior Court, 31 Cal. App. 3d 635, 107 Cal.
Rptr. 546 (1973).
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the subjective thoughts of the individual citizen. Instead, it must
be determined by the objective circumstances and the responses
which they are likely to evoke .... -138 The focus of the inquiry
must be: what would a reasonable person, innocent of any crime,
have thought had he been in the same or similar situation?13 9 As-
signing controlling importance to the arrestee's subjective under-
standing in ambiguous situations has been rejected. The United
States Supreme Court, however, has indicated a willingness to
give more emphasis to the privacy expectations of the individual in
its most recent seizure decisions. 14 0
C. The Role of Restraint
State v. Lloyd' 41 and Clements v. State' 42 illustrate the general
rule that an actual or constructive seizure or detention of the ar-
restee by a person having the present power to control him is an
essential element of an arrest. There can be no arrest in the ab-
sence of this element.
In Lloyd, two armed officers stopped the defendants' vehicle,
ordered them out of the car and searched them for weapons. One
of the officers then walked around the car looking inside with his
flashlight. He spotted a cashbox on the floor partially beneath a
seat.143 The defense contended the search was not incident to, but
preceded the arrest, because no arrest took place until after the
box was found and the defendants had been hand-cuffed and were
told they were under arrest. The court held the arrest occurred at
the moment the car was stopped and the defendants were ordered
out, observing that an arrest "is complete when the person ar-
rested is first detained,"' 44 without considering the officers' intent.
In Clements, the police stopped defendant's car, ordered him
out at gunpoint and searched his person and car. The Georgia
Supreme Court found the arrest occurred at the moment the police
approached defendant's car and compelled him to get out. The
court declared:
An arrest is accomplished whenever the liberty of another to come and go
as he pleases is restrained, no matter how slight such restraint may be.
The [arrestee] may voluntarily submit to being considered under arrest
138. Cook v. Sigler, 299 F. Supp. 1338, 1343 (D. Neb. 1969). Accord, United States v.
Grandi, 424 F.2d 399 (2d Cir. 1970); Coates v. United States, 413 F.2d 371 (D.C.
Cir. 1969); United States v. McKethan, 247 F. Supp. 324 (D.D.C. 1965).
139. United States v. Lampkin, 464 F.2d 1093 (3d Cir. 1972); Hickes v. United
States, 382 F.2d 158 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
140. See note 76 supra.
141. 92 Idaho 20, 435 P.2d 797 (1967).
142. 226 Ga. 66, 172 S.E.2d 600 (1970).
143. 92 Idaho at 22, 435 P.2d at 799.
144. Id. Accord, State v. Wolfson, 116 N.H. 227, 356 A.2d 692 (1976).
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without any actual touching or show of force, and the arrest is com-
plete.1
4 5
The approach adopted by the court in Clements not only repre-
sents the general rule, but also the ideal rule.146 This. ideal rule
rejects the Terry line of decisions and fails to recognize any type of
seizure short of an arrest.
If the detainee was not free to leave the detainor's presence, the
courts have generally found an arrest,14 7 or, at least a "detention
... indistinguishable from a traditional arrest."1 48 Price v. United
States 4 9 presents an interesting application of this view. In Price,
an officer seized an envelope as it was being passed from a known
criminal to another man. The officer then looked inside the envel-
ope and told the men they were under arrest. The defense con-
tended the seizure of the envelope preceded the arrest and could
not be justified as incident to the arrest. The court disagreed, hold-
ing the arrest occurred at the precise moment the officer seized the
envelope, because "[w] e doubt that appellants had liberty to take
leave of the officer's presence once he seized the envelope."'5 0
Therefore, the seizure of the envelope was incident to the arrest.
Some courts have held an arrest occurs only when the arrestor
touches the arrestee or tells the arrestee he is under arrest and he
submits.' 5 ' The touching need not be a physical contact with the
arrestee's person or clothing, but may be contact with the arres-
tee's vehicle.' 52 Price may be this type of case.
A legal fiction has been created to dispose of those cases where
an actual seizure was attempted, but failed. In State ex. rel. Sadler
v. District Court,'5 3 the court stated "[a] constructive detention is
accomplished by merely touching, however slightly, the body of
the accused by the person making the arrest and for that purpose,
although he does not succeed in stopping or holding [the accused]
even for an instant . . ."54 The rationale supporting the rule of
145. 226 Ga. at 67, 172 S.E.2d at 601. See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 41 (1968).
146. See also People v. Smith, 62 Misc. 2d 473, 477, 308 N.Y.S.2d 909, 914 (1970),
where the court held "the term 'arrest' may be applied where a person is
restrainted in his full liberty and such detention is continued for even a short
period of time." Such a holding necessarily excludes consideration of the "ar-
restor's" purpose or intent and renders the understanding of the "arrestee"
totally irrelevant. It would have been analytically preferable had the court
used the word "seizure" instead of the word "arrest."
147. State v. Vaughn, 12 Ariz. App. 442, 444, 471 P.2d 744, 746 (1970).
148. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. at 212.
149. 119 A.2d 718 (D.C. App. 1956).
150. Id. at 719.
151. McChan v. State, 238 Md. 149, 157, 207 A.2d 632, 638 (1965).
152. Weissengoff v. Davis, 260 F. 16 (4th Cir. 1919).
153. 70 Mont. 378, 225 P. 1000 (1924).
154. Id. at 386, 225 P. at 1002.
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constructive seizure or detention is that since the arrestor was
close enough to touch the arrestee, the arrestee should be consid-
ered to have come within the power of the law, as represented by
the arrestor.155 The operation of this fiction is limited to the extent
that the arrestor must have intended to arrest the person touched.
Without such an intent, there can be no arrest. This theoretical
limitation on the doctrine of constructive seizure gives police the
right to forcibly detain for investigative purposes without being
held to have arrested the person detained.156 Legal metaphysics
aside, it is clear that an actual physical restraint is not neces-
sary. 5 7 Further, the arrestee's submission to the arrestor's impo-
sition of control is sufficient restraint for purposes of satisfying this
element of an arrest.
D. Authority to Arrest
If a warrant has been obtained, the authority of the holder of
the warrant to arrest the person named in the warrant is generally
not open to question. The questions raised in such cases usually
focus on the propriety of the issuance of the warrant. 58 In the
warrantless arrest situation, the authority to arrest is derived from
the circumstances surrounding the arrest. At early common law,
any person was authorized to arrest for a felony committed or at-
tempted in their presence.'59 This standard was extended to au-
thorize arrest for felony on reasonable grounds to believe the
proposed arrestee had committed it.160 Authority to arrest for mis-
demeanors was restricted to offenses constituting breaches of the
peace, committed in the presence of the arrestor.16' The purpose
of the requirement that the action taken be under real or assumed
authority has been explained as an assurance that taking custody
of another person is not a mere abduction, devoid of legality.162
The indefinite standard of the fourth amendment has allowed
courts to tip the balance between the competing interests of effec-
tive law enforcement and individual rights, in favor of law enforce-
155. E. FISHER, supra note 24, at 50; text accompanying notes 92-100 supra.
156. Jenkins v. United States, 161 F.2d 99 (10th Cir. 1947).
157. See United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976).
158. There are questions when the police act on a teletype or radio message indi-
cating a warrant has been issued. See State v. Foust, 262 So. 2d 686 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1972). Questions dealing with the use of force by either the arrestor
or the arrestee can come up whether the arrest is supported by a warrant or
is attempted without a warrant. See NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 28-1406 to -1416 (Cure.
Supp. 1978).
159. E. FISHER, supra note 24, at 124.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 125.
162. Id. at 44.
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ment needs. The fourth amendment, unlike other protective
provisions of the Bill of Rights, is phrased in terms of reasonable-
ness. Thus, the balancing approach can be applied legitimately to
the law of arrest. The current national trend is to emphasize the
importance of the arrestor's intent or purpose to the detriment of
individual rights, although there is a fresh breeze from the United
States Supreme Court. 163 It is only against this backdrop that Ne-
braska's law of arrest is understandable.
III. ARREST, NEBRASKA-STYLE
A. General Principles
An examination of Nebraska statutes and Nebraska Supreme
Court decisions reveals that neither the Legislature nor the court
has ever defined arrest in the criminal context. The lack of a prin-
cipled definition has caused the court to seem inconsistent and un-
predictable in distinguishing detentions from arrests.1' The court
has not taken advantage of the opportunity presented by statute16
to make a clear distinction between detention and arrest.
Nebraska's equivalent of a "stop and frisk" law 66 is patterned
163. See note 76 supra.
164. The distinction could become important in escape prosecutions under the
Nebraska Criminal Code. NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-912(1) (Cum. Supp. 1978) pro-
vides:
A person commits escape if he unlawfully removes himself from
official detention or fails to return to official detention following tem-
porary leave granted for a specific purpose or limited period. Official
detention shall mean arrest, detention in or transportation to any fa-
cility for custody of persons under charge or conviction of crime or
contempt or for persons alleged or found to be delinquent, detention
for extradition or deportation, or any other detention for law enforce-
ment purposes; but official detention does not include supervision of
probation or parole or constraint incidental to release on bail.
165. NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-829 (Reissue 1975) provides:
A peace officer may stop any person in a public place whom he
reasonably suspects of committing, who has committed, or who is
about to commit a crime and may demand of him his name, address
and an explanation of his actions. When a peace officer has stopped
a person for questioning pursuant to this section and reasonably sus-
pects he is in danger of life or limb, he may search such person for a
dangerous weapon. If the peace officer finds such a weapon or any
other thing the possession of which may constitute a crime, he may
take and keep it until the completion of questioning, at which time he
shall either return it, if lawfully possessed, or arrest such person.
For purposes of this section, peace officer shall include credentialed
conservation officers of the Game and Parks Commission.
In State v. Huffman, 181 Neb. 356, 148 N.W.2d 321 (1967), the court referred
to a section 29-829 stop as an informal detention. In State v. Micek, 193 Neb.
379, 227 N.W.2d 409 (1975), the court discussed a stop and detention, followed
by an arrest.
166. NEB. REv. STAT. § 29-829 (Reissue 1975).
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after the detention and protective search provisions of the Uniform
Arrest Act.167 However, Nebraska has not adopted the accompany-
ing arrest provisions of the Uniform Act. In State v. Klinehoffer,168
the Delaware Superior Court made a clear distinction between de-
tention and arrest, based upon the Uniform Arrest Act approach.
Under that Act, an officer may stop any person he reasonably sus-
pects is committing, has committed or is about to commit a crime
and demand the person's name, address, purpose in being where
he is and eventual destination. If the detainee's answers are un-
satisfactory, the officer may continue the detention for further in-
vestigation, not to exceed two hours, unless an arrest is made.169
In Klinehoffer, the officer stopped and questioned Klinehoffer re-
lating to suspected drunken driving. The officer took Klinehoffer
to the police station where he was questioned further, tested, and
told he was being arrested and jailed overnight.
Klinehoffer argued that if he was merely detained, the deten-
tion exceeded the two-hour limit and that immediately after the
expiration of the two-hour period he was not "arrested and
charged with a crime or released," as required by the statute. He
further argued that, if he was arrested and charged properly, then
he was not taken before the nearest available magistrate within a
reasonable time as required by a superior court rule. He had been
held in jail from 1:00 a.m. until 10:00 a.m. of the same day before
being taken before a magistrate. 7 0
On the question of whether Klinehoffer had been detained or
167. See UAA §§ 2, 3. The legislative history of NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-829 (Reissue
1975) indicates the Legislature was only aware the statute was modeled on
the New York "stop and frisk" law, N.Y. Code Crim. Prac. § 180a (McKinney
Supp. 1967), which, in turn, is based upon the UAA. The Nebraska Legisla-
ture gave its primary attention to the frisk portion of the statute, but did real-
ize they were also authorizing investigative detentions. See Comm. on
Judiciary, Minutes, L.B. 76, Neb. Leg., 75th Sess. (Jan. 27, 1965); Floor De-
bates 53-54 (Feb. 2, 1965); Floor Debates 205-07 (Feb. 17, 1965); Floor Debates
212 (Feb. 18, 1965).
168. 173 A.2d 478 (Del. Super. Ct. 1961). Delaware, New Hampshire and Rhode
Island have all adopted the UAA, which their highest courts have construed
several times. See generally Cannon v. State, 53 Del. 284, 168 A.2d 108 (1961);
De Salvatore v. State, 52 Del. 550, 163 A.2d 244 (1960); State v. Rocheleau, 117
N.H. 792, 378 A.2d 1381 (1977); State v. Wolfson, 116 N.H. 227, 356 A.2d 692
(1976); State v. Schofield, 114 N.H. 454,322 A.2d 603 (1974); State v. Hutton, 108
N.H. 279, 235 A.2d 117 (1967); State v. Murray, 106 N.H. 71, 205 A.2d 29 (1964);
Berberian v. Smith, 99 RI.L 198, 206 A.2d 531 (1965); State v. Mercurio, 96 R.I.
464, 194 A.2d 574 (1963); Kavanagh v. Stenhouse, 93 R. 252, 174 A.2d 560
(1961).
169. Compare the much more detailed provisions of ALI CODE, supra note 28,
§ 110.2. See State v. Micek, 193 Neb. 379, 227 N.W.2d 409 (1975), holding a 27
minute detention reasonable for purposes of an investigative detention.
170. 173 A.2d at 479-80.
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arrested, the court held: "[T]here is nothing ... which in the
slightest degree indicated that defendant was 'detained', i.e. was
taken into custody for the purpose of ascertaining his name, ad-
dress, business abroad and where he was going,. . . he was taken
to the ... [police station] and that constituted an arrest.' 71 The
Act provides that an arrest is the taking of a person into custody so
that he may be required to answer for the commission of a crime.
Under such an interpretation, a detention pursuant to Nebraska
law172 in its strictest sense, should similarly be construed to au-
thorize police officers to stop and hold persons fitting the statutory
description for no longer than is necessary to determine their iden-
tity and an explanation of their actions. Anything more would con-
stitute a more severe intrusion than the statutory detention and
should be supported by a stricter standard of reasonable belief or
probable cause. Moreover, in view of the common origin of the
Delaware and Nebraska statutes on detention, the interpretations
of the statutes should be the same.
Rather than adopting a definition of arrest in the criminal con-
text, the Nebraska Supreme Court, to date, has used a case by
case, fact-based approach. This approach fails to provide any cer-
tainty and predictability in an area of law vitally affecting individ-
ual rights. In a sense, the court has defined arrest in the civil
context.
In Schmidt v. Richman Gordman, Inc.,173 a security guard ap-
prehended and detained the plaintiffs. The guard personally de-
cided not to allow plaintiffs to leave the store. Plaintiffs testified to
their belief that they could not leave the room in which the guard
confined them. The guard testified that had plaintiffs attempted to
leave, she would have pursued them. The police officer who came
to pick up reported shoplifters testified that when he arrived at the
store the plaintiffs were in the custody of the guard and were
under arrest. At the point of the initial confrontation between
plaintiffs and the guard, she showed them her badge and creden-
tials and asked them to accompany her to the office, where they
were later confined. The defense contended that the trial court in-
structed the jury erroneously with respect to what constitutes an
arrest. The Nebraska Supreme Court approved the jury instruc-
tion, which followed closely a standard definition of arrest. 174
171. Id. at 480. For a discussion of detention as a status for purposes of an escape
statute, see State v. Shook, 45 Ohio App. 2d 32, 340 N.E.2d 423 (1975). For a
good discussion of police contacts with citizens not amounting to a detention,
see Batts v. Superior Court, 23 Cal. App. 2d 435, 100 Cal. Rptr. 181 (1972).
172. NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-829 (Reissue 1975).
173. 191 Neb. 345, 215 N.W.2d 105 (1974).
174. Id. at 350, 215 N.W.2d at 109-110.
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Since a jury instruction is "an exposition (of) the rules or prin-
ciples of law... which the jury are bound to accept and apply,"' 7 5
the approval of the encyclopedia definition of arrest is tantamount
to an adoption of that definition as Nebraska law. The definition
approved in Schmidt comprises all the elements of an arrest. 7 6 As
a general proposition, arrest for purposes of a civil case and a crim-
inal case should mean the same thing, since the same privacy and
liberty interests are involved in either type of litigation. Nebraska
has not adopted the Uniform Arrest Act definition or any other
statutory definition, thus nothing prevents consistent judicial
treatment.
An examination of Nebraska criminal arrest cases must begin
with State v. O'Kelly.177 In O'Kelly, the court adopted the federal
constitutional exclusionary rule and interpreted the Nebraska
Constitution to require exclusion of evidence obtained as the fruit
of illegal searches or seizures. 178 Citing Ker v. California17 9 for the
proposition that the lawfulness of an arrest is to be determined
according to state law as long as the pertinent state law does not
violate the fourth amendment, the Nebraska Supreme Court said:
"[I]t has long been established in Nebraska that a police officer
may arrest without a warrant when it appears that a felony has
been committed and that there are reasonable grounds to believe
that the person arrested is guilty of the offense."'8 0 Despite the
fact that the court cited Nebraska statutory law' 81 as authority for
that proposition (although the statute is limited by its terms to
warrantless arrests by persons other than police officers),182 this
statement was necessary to reach the conclusion that Nebraska's
warrantless arrest law complied with the fourth amendment. The
court then concluded "reasonable ground to believe the person ar-
rested is guilty of such offense" is the equivalent in statutory lan-
An arrest is the taking, seizing, or detaining of the person of an-
other, (1) by touching or putting hands on him; (2) or by any act that
indicates an intention to take him into custody and that subjects him
to the actual control and will of the person making the arrest or (3)
by the consent of the person to be arrested.
5 AM. Jur. 2d Arrest § 1 (1962).
175. BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 769 (5th ed. 1979).
176. See text accompanying note 27 supra.
177. 175 Neb. 798, 124 N.W.2d 211 (1963).
178. Id. at 804, 124 N.W.2d at 215.
179. 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
180. 175 Neb. at 805, 124 N.W.2d at 215.
181. NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-402 (Reissue 1975).
182. NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-402 (Reissue 1975), which has not been altered since
O'Kelly, provides: "Any person not an officer may, without warrant, arrest
any person, if a petit larcency or a felony has been committed, and there is
reasonable ground to believe the person arrested guilty of such offense, and
may detain him until a legal warrant can be obtained."
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guage of the fourth amendment's prohibition of unreasonable
seizures 183 and is another way of describing probable cause.184
The occurrence of an arrest was not an issue in O'Kelly. How-
ever, there would have been no grounds for controversy as to when
it occurred. The police were waiting at O'Kelly's residence when
he arrived. He was asked to step out of his vehicle, searched, and
told he was under arrest and would have to go to the police sta-
tion.185 There was an announcement of the officers' intent, as well
as physical restraint when he was put in the cruiser. Even if the
officers' announcement would not have made their intent clear,
their subsequent conduct would have sufficed to make it clear
under both the objective and subjective tests. Unfortunately, clar-
ity in the Nebraska cases ends with O'Kelly.
In State v. Dillwood, 86 the court adopted the Nebraska version
of the Terry rule. A plainclothes detective was patrolling at night
in an unmarked car. A burglar alarm alerted police of a break-in in
the vicinity in which the detective was patrolling. The detective
responded by driving to the location of the alarm. Witnessing
neither pedestrian nor vehicular traffic, but observing a broken
store window, the detective drove further. He followed a car with
round taillights but soon lost sight of the car. He turned on the
first perpendicular street, continued for a block, looked up a cross
street and saw a car with round taillights. He followed it. Eventu-
ally, the car with round taillights stopped for a stop sign.
By this time, another detective also in plainclothes and an un-
marked car, was helping in the pursuit. At the stop sign, the detec-
tives blocked the suspect vehicle. The occupants of the blocked
vehicle "exited on the run. ' 187 The detectives jumped from their
vehicles with pistols drawn and threatened to shoot. At the threat,
Dillwood stopped. One detective led Dillwood back by the arm to
the suspect car and frisked him. Both detectives observed several
furs plainly visible on the back seat of Dillwood's car.
Dillwood contended that an arrest occurred when the detective
took him by the arm to return to the car. The purpose of this con-
tention was to show an illegal arrest, in order to defeat the search
as incident to a lawful arrest.188 The real thrust of this contention
was to invalidate the initial stop, an approach which, if successful,
183. 175 Neb. at 805, 124 N.W.2d at 216.
184. Accord, People v. Sullivan, 214 Cal. App. 2d 404, 29 Cal. Rptr. 515 (1963); De
Salvatore v. State, 52 Del. 550, 163 A.2d 244 (1960); State v. Harris, 265 Minn.
260, 121 N.W.2d 327 (1963); Schnepp v. State, 82 Nev. 257, 415 P.2d 619 (1966).
185. 175 Neb. at 803, 124 N.W.2d at 214.
186. 183 Neb. 360, 160 N.W.2d 195 (1968).
187. Id. at 362, 160 N.W.2d at 197.
188. Id. at 360, 160 N.W.2d at 195.
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would have rendered the furs inadmissible even under the plain
view doctrine.
The court's decision is difficult to understand at best. The court
emphasized that the detectives were not uniformed, they drove un-
marked cars and failed to announce their authority or purpose
when they threatened the fleeing Dillwood. The Dillwood court
opined that "[ilt was almost impossible for the drawn pistols...
to be either a cause or a consequence of defendant's decision to
flee."' 89 The court concluded that the forcible stop was reasonable,
because necessary to freeze the situation. To Dillwood's conten-
tion that grasping his arm constituted an arrest, the court replied:
"We think not."' 9 0 The court based its decision on the Terry dis-
tinction in purpose, character and extent between a search inci-
dent to arrest and a limited protective weapons search, and its
position that probable cause is not necessary to justify any intru-
sions short of an arrest 9 1
Factually, Terry and Dillwood are significantly different. In
Terry, the officer did not approach the suspects with his pistol
drawn; he did identify himself; initially, he did not forcibly stop the
suspects. The circumstances of the cases are similar in that a set
of articulable facts formed the bases for the respective officers'
conclusions that criminal activity was afoot. However, in Dillwood
there was nothing said to connect the car with the round taillights
to the broken store window. Further, there was nothing in the
court's rendition of the facts to show that the car with round tail-
lights was the same car the detective initially decided to follow. In
Terry, the connection between the suspects and the store window
was plain. Under the Terry rationale, the detectives unquestiona-
bly seized Dillwood in the fourth amendment sense. 92
In terms of the law of arrest, there is little doubt that the detec-
tives' conduct in Diliwood created some ambiguity in the mind of
the detainee. There was an actual seizure, complete with physical
touching and an obvious display of force. Dillwood submitted to
the unidentified officers' assertion of control over him. His reason-
able interpretation of his status should have been controlling.
There was an arrest, if not at the moment when the detectives
blocked Dillwood's car,19 3 then certainly under the Schmidt defini-
189. Id. at 363, 160 N.W.2d at 198.
190. Id.
191. Id. See text accompanying notes 44-59, 61-62 supra. This position, following
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979), and Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S.
200 (1979), is clearly no longer valid, if it ever was.
192. 392 U.S. at 19 n.16.
193. Cf. Berberian v. Smith, 99 R.L 198, 206 A.2d 531 (1965) (blocking car consti-
tutes an arrest).
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tion of arrest, at the moment they threatened to shoot.194 How-
ever, the court held otherwise. 195
It is interesting to note that Dillwood was decided without ref-
erence to Nebraska's "stop and frisk" statute. 19 6 The court could
have relied on the statute in Dillwood, as it had in State v. Carpen-
ter.197 In Carpenter, two local officers patrolling in a cruiser ob-
served an out-of-county car at about 3:30 a.m. in an area where
several burglaries had recently occurred. The officers stopped the
car after it seemed to purposely elude them. While speaking with
the passenger of the car, one of the officers saw a pry bar protrud-
ing from under the car seat. The officers asked the men to accom-
pany them to the police station. At the station, the officers learned
one of the men was a known burglar. At that time, the decision
was made to arrest both men.198
Carpenter contended an arrest occurred outside the city limits
when the police stopped the car without probable cause. The court
held, that under the "stop and frisk" statute, 199 a police officer has
the authority to stop and question on less than probable cause.
The court did not discuss the meaning of the statutory language
"reasonably suspects." The officers had testified their only intent
in stopping the car was to identify the occupants. This is proper
under the statute, if the officer reasonably suspects any person in a
public place of criminal activity.200 Following the purposive ap-
proach, the court felt such official behavior was constitutional. 20'
The court cited Bonanno as authority for the proposition that
"every temporary restriction of the absolute freedom of movement
is not an arrest. '20 2 A stop for purposes of identification is "not in
any sense an arrest. '20 3 In this case, the court held the arrest was
made at the police station, after Carpenter had been given a
chance to exculpate himself.2 04 The Carpenter decision was
194. See text accompanying notes 173-74 supra. In fairness to the court, the
reader should note Schmidt was decided in 1974, six years after Dillwood.
However, the principles underlying Schmidt date from as early as Kyner v.
Laubner, 3 Neb. (Unoff.) 370, 91 N.W. 491 (1902). See also text accompanying
note 38 supra.
195. 183 Neb. at 363, 160 N.W.2d at 198.
196. NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-829 (Supp. 1965).
197. 181 Neb. 639, 150 N.W.2d 129 (1967).
198. Id. at 643, 150 N.W.2d at 132.
199. NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-829 (Reissue 1975).
200. See note 162 supra.
201. 181 Neb. at 646, 150 N.W.2d at 134.
202. Id. at 646, 150 N.W.2d at 134.
203. 181 Neb. at 645-46, 150 N.W.2d at 134. An identification stop is, however, a
seizure. Brown v. Texas, 99 S. Ct. 2637, 2640 (1979).
204. 181 Neb. at 645-46, 150 N.W.2d at 134. The chance-to-exculpate-himself idea
was also a factor which impressed Judge Kaufman in Bonanno as a policy
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clearly correct and in line with the Terry rule. Further, the court
was consistent with the general law of arrest,20 5 at least under the
purposive approach.206
The rationale of Adams v. Williams,20 7 was incorporated into
Nebraska case law in State v. Brewer2° 8 and State v. Irwin.20 9 In
Brewer, the police had received detailed information from a relia-
ble informant concerning plans for a robbery and the persons in-
volved in the planning. The police observed the home of one of the
alleged conspirators. When a car which had been described by the
informant drove by and the occupants waved to the police, the po-
lice stopped the car. Brewer complied with a request to get out of
the car. He gave a name, stated he had no identification with him,
and gave evasive answers to questions about his activities. One
officer knew from prior contact that the person whose name
Brewer used that Brewer was not that person. The officers con-
consideration in favor of upholding the power to detain for investigation on
less than probable cause. United States v. Bonanno, 180 F. Supp. 71
(S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other grounds sub. nom., United States v. Bufalino, 285
F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1960). Other courts have interpreted the words "reasonable
suspicion" when used in a statute as equivalent to the probable cause re-
quirement of the fourth amendment. See text accompanying notes 183-84
supra.
205. State v. Carpenter, 181 Neb. 639, 150 N.W.2d 129 (1967), affid, State v. McCune,
189 Neb. 165, 201 N.W.2d 852 (1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 954 (1973).
206. Brown v. Texas, 99 S. Ct. 2637 (1979), should not be interpreted to cast doubt
upon the constitutionality of NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-829 (Reissue 1975). The
stop-and-identify statute involved in Brown criminally penalized any person
intentionally refusing to report his name and address to a peace officer who
has lawfully stopped and requested the information from him. The Court de-
clined to decide whether a person may be punished for refusing to identify
himself in the context of a lawful investigatory stop which satisfies fourth
amendment requirements. Id. at 2641 n.3. The Court simply decided that
"none of the circumstances preceding the ... detention... justified a rea-
sonable suspicion that he [Brown] was involved in criminal conduct." Id.
In reaching that result, the Court noted.
We have recognized that in some circumstances an officer may de-
tain a suspect briefly for questioning although he does not have
'probable cause' to believe that the suspect is involved in criminal
activity, as is required for a traditional arrest .... However, we have
required the officers to have a reasonable suspicion, based on objec-
tive facts, that the individual is involved in criminal activity.
Id. Michigan v. DeFillippo, 99 S. Ct. 2627 (1979), while concerned with the
effect of an arrest under the same type of stop-and-identify ordinance as the
statute in Brown for purposes of a search incident to that arrest, has no appli-
cation to the validity of statutes like NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-829 (Reissue 1975).
207. 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
208. 190 Neb. 667, 212 N.W.2d 90 (1973).
209. 191 Neb. 169, 214 N.W.2d 595 (1974). See State v. Anderson, 204 Neb. 186, 281
N.W.2d 743 (1979); State v. Booth, 202 Neb. 692, 276 N.W.2d 673 (1979); State v.
Von Suggs, 196 Neb. 757, 246 N.W.2d 206 (1976); State v. Brown, 195 Neb. 321,
237 N.W.2d 861 (1976); State v. icek, 193 Neb. 379, 227 N.W.2d 409 (1975).
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ferred and decided to arrest Brewer for giving false information to
an officer. A search ensued, netting several weapons.210
Brewer contended the stop was an unlawful arrest because not
based upon probable cause. The court relied on Adams v. Wil-
liams for the proposition that information given the police by a
credible informant can form the basis for an officer's reasonable
suspicion that criminal activity is occurring.2 11 Pursuant to Stat-
ute,212 the court held "[a] police officer may in appropriate circum-
stances and in an appropriate manner approach a person for the
purpose of investigating possible criminal behavior even though
there is no probable cause to make an arrest. '213
In State v. Irwin, the court seems to have decided that the ar-
restor's intent is the controlling factor in determining whether an
arrest has occurred.214 The officers stopped Irwin's car apparently
by use of their flashing red lights. After Irwin stopped, one officer
approached each side of the car. The officer on the driver's side
displayed his badge and asked Irwin if he would accompany them
to the police station to talk. Meanwhile, the other officer tapped on
the passenger window. Irwin unlocked the door. The officer
opened the door and asked if he could ride along to the station.
Irwin consented.2 15
Both officers subsequently testified that, at that time, neither
had any intention of arresting Irwin and neither officer told, nor in
any other manner indicated to, Irwin that he was under arrest.
One officer testified Irwin would have been free to go had he re-
fused to go to the station. The other officer testified Irwin would
not have been allowed to leave the station after he tried to discard
some incriminating evidence.2 16 In holding the arrest did not occur
until after Irwin arrived at the station, the court articulated only
three factual bases for their conclusion: 1) it was reasonable to ask
Irwin to go to the station because it was raining at the time of the
stop; 2) Irwin agreed to go to the station before the second officer
asked to ride along (although this point is not at all clear); and 3)
the officers' testimony as to their intentions at the time of the
stop.2 17
210. 190 Neb. at 672, 212 N.W.2d at 93.
211. Id. at 675, 212 N.W.2d at 94.
212. NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-829 (Reissue 1975).
213. 190 Neb. at 674, 212 N.W.2d at 94 (emphasis added).
214. 191 Neb. at 182-83, 214 N.W.2d at 603-04.
215. Id. at 175, 214 N.W.2d at 600.
216. Id. at 176, 214 N.W.2d at 600.
217. 191 Neb. at 182, 214 N.W.2d at 603. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, also
relying on Adams v. Williams, upheld the decision of the Nebraska Supreme
Court, but limited its holding to one based "upon the facts found." Irwin v.
Wolff, 529 F.2d 1119, 1123 (8th Cir. 1976).
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The troublesome feature of this decision is not simply the
court's reliance on the officers' intention, but that the court ignored
the question of whether the officers' intention was effectively com-
municated to the defendant. The officers testified they neither told
nor indicated to Irwin that he was under arrest 218 at the time of the
request to go to the station. The court failed to consider whether
Irwin could have understood the officers' apparently private intent,
and whether a reasonable person in Irwin's situation would have
recognized the officers' intent. Would a reasonable person have
felt himself free to do as he pleased after being asked to go to a
police station with an officer riding along? Reasonable minds
could differ on that point, yet the court failed to mention the exist-
ence of the question.2 19
These Nebraska criminal cases demonstrate that under Ne-
braska law, the controlling element is the intent of the arrestor in
determining whether an arrest has occurred. More precisely, it is
the intent that the arresting officer is willing to attest to entertain-
ing at the crucial time. Of only secondary importance in determin-
ing the occurrence of an arrest in Nebraska is: the force used, the
arrestee's understanding, and the communication or lack thereof
to the arrestee of the arrestor's identity, authority, and intent.220
The overemphasis of the arrestor's intent has obscured the
function of the arrestor's purpose in general legal terms. It is the
arrestor's purpose of bringing the arrestee before a court, body or
official, or otherwise securing the administration of the law, which
confers a privilege upon the arrestor to take the steps necessary to
effect an arrest. Unless an arrest is effected for that purpose, it is
not privileged. 221 It is this purpose which properly is and should
be important, not the arrestor's characterization of his acts as a
simple detention as opposed to an arrest.
218. One must query whether an officer's testimony of what his actions indicated
to another person can be competent evidence.
219. After Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979), it should be apparent that
police officers must make it clear to anyone they wish to interview at the sta-
tion that they are not under any constraint to do so. Otherwise, the interview
may be open to attack. It is in precisely the Irwin and Dillwood type of cases
where the arrestors' actions are ambiguous that the arrestee's understanding
should assume controlling importance. If the arrestor simply tells his subject
what his status truly is, then the ambiguity is resolved.
220. The court has held that if exigent circumstances exist, then a prior disclosure
of purpose and authority is unnecessary. In State v. Brooks, 189 Neb. 592, 204
N.W.2d 86 (1973), the court allowed the police to enter a home without prior
disclosure of their purpose or authority because the officers had seen what
looked like a drug sale going on inside the house. The screen door was
closed, but the inside door was sufficiently ajar in order for the officers to see
inside.
221. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 127 (1965).
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B. Nebraska Warrantless Arrest Authority
Initially, Nebraska followed the common law, supplemented by
its own statutory authority.222 The common law authorized war-
rantless felony arrests only when the arrestor had reasonable
grounds to believe the arrestee had committed a felony. Warrant-
less misdemeanor arrests were authorized only when the crime in-
volved a breach of the peace committed in the arrestor's
presence. 223 Both the Nebraska Supreme Court and the Nebraska
Legislature have extended the common law in Nebraska.
As noted, in State v. O'Kelly,224 the court construed specific leg-
islation as authority for an arrest without a warrant when it ap-
pears a felony has been committed and there are reasonable
grounds to believe the arrestee committed it, even though that
statute only deals with arrests by persons who are not peace of-
ficers.225 Six years later, in State v. Beasley,226 the court held: "[a]
peace officer may now arrest a person without a warrant if he has
reasonable cause to believe that such person has committed a fel-
ony."227 Ignoring its decision in O'Kelly, the Beasley court recog-
nized the enactment of a new arrest statute.228
In 1967, the Nebraska Legislature adopted a set of statutes,
based upon section 120.1 of the Model Code of Pre-Arraignment
Procedure.22 9 The Act was said to codify the common law and sig-
nificantly extend warrantless arrest authority.230 The extension of
222. NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-401 (Reissue 1975) provides:
Every sheriff, deputy sheriff, constable, marshal or deputy marshal,
watchman, police officer, or peace officer as defined in subdivision(17) of section 49-801, shall arrest and detain any person found violat-
ing any law of this state, or any legal ordinance of any city or incorpo-
rated village, until a legal warrant can be obtained; Provided, that (1)
within twenty-four hours of the arrest, with or without warrant, of
any child under eighteen years of age, the parent, guardian, or custo-
dian of such child shall be notified of the arrest, and (2) the court in
which the child is to appear shall not accept a plea from the child
until finding that the parents of the child have been notified or that
reasonable efforts to notify such parents have been made.
NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-402 (Reissue 1975) provides: "Any person not an officer
may, without warrant, arrest any person, if a petit larceny or a felony has
been committed, and there is reasonable ground to believe the person ar-
rested guilty of such offense, and may detain him until a legal warrant can be
obtained."
223. See text accompanying notes 128-31 supra.
224. 175 Neb. 798, 124 N.W.2d 211 (1963).
225. See text accompanying note 177 supra.
226. 183 Neb. 681, 163 N.W.2d 783 (1969).
227. Id. at 685, 163 N.W.2d at 786 (emphasis added).
228. Id., 163 N.W.2d at 786-87.
229. L.B. 395 (1967) (codified at NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 29-404.01 to -404.03 (Reissue
1975)).
230. Id.
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the common law represents a legislative policy determination that
warrantless misdemeanor arrests by peace officers should be al-
lowed for misdemeanors not committed in the arresting officer's
presence in what has-been characterized as cases of necessity.23 1
Such cases of necessity occur when the officer has reasonable
cause to believe the arrestee has committed a misdemeanor and
reasonable cause to believe the arrestee either "will not be appre-
hended unless immediately arrested; [or] may cause injury to
himself or others or damage to property unless immediately ar-
rested. '23 2 The Nebraska Legislature added a third "case of neces-
sity" to the American Law Institute's formulation: reasonable
cause to believe the arrestee "may destroy or conceal evidence of
the commission of" the misdemeanor.233
It has been argued that the inherent limitations in this ex-
panded warrantless arrest authority may restrain abuse.234 The of-
ficer must be able to show, in addition to traditional probable
cause to believe the arrestee has committed a misdemeanor, an
articulable set of facts to support a reasonable belief at the time of
the arrest that the arrestee would not have been apprehended; or,
personal injury or property damage might have resulted; or, evi-
dence might have been lost, had the arrest not been effected imme-
diately.23 5 Further, it has been observed that "as a policy matter, it
may well be that this statute only recognizes what has been occur-
ring. No doubt, it is best to recognize reality and thus be able to
exert some control over the situation."23 6
As a matter of abstract theory, the inherent limitations idea is a
good one. However, State v. McCune,237 has shown that Nebraska
practice will not always be so limited. In McCune, a Buffalo
County deputy sheriff saw McCune's car parked on a county road
late at night in Sherman County. There were beer cans lying
around the car on the fresh snow. The only tracks on the road
were those made by the McCune vehicle. Since he was without his
jurisdiction, the deputy drove on. He later contacted the Sherman
County Sheriff. The two officers returned to the place where Mc-
Cune's car had been parked. The car was gone. An hour later, the
two officers stopped McCune's car in Buffalo County. The deputy
231. ALI CODE, supra note 28, § 120.1, Commentary at 130.
232. NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-404.02(2) (a), (b) (Reissue 1975).
233. NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-404.02(2) (c) (Reissue 1975). Also, "[t]he provisions of
section 29-404.01 to 29-404.03 shall be supplemental and in addition to any
other laws relating to the subject of arrest." NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-404.01 (Reis-
sue 1975).
234. Meyer, supra note 5, at 718.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. 189 Neb. 165, 201 N.W.2d 852 (1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 954 (1973).
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approached the car to ask about the beer cans on the snow in Sher-
man County. He detected a strong odor of liquor in the car and
could see several people in the car. He asked the occupants to get
out of the car. One of them was a fifteen-year-old girl, while the
others were of legal age. There was a beer can on the floor of the
car where McCune had been sitting. McCune was arrested and
later convicted of contributing to the delinquency of a minor.23 8
McCune contended the evidence resulting from the arrest
should have been suppressed because there was no probable
cause to arrest at the time his car was stopped. First, the court
emphasized the right and duty of peace officers to investigate and
prevent crime. The stop was held to have been authorized under
the "stop and frisk" provision,23 9 because the court believed the
facts (the parked car surrounded by beer cans), were sufficient to
justify a reasonable suspicion that a crime had been committed.240
The court announced that it was not essential for an officer to im-
mediately stop and investigate under the statute.241 Here, it was
reasonable to delay the investigation since the deputy was outside
his jurisdiction at the time he formed his reasonable suspicion.242
The arrest was held lawful under the statute.243 Unfortunately,
the court did not specify which of the three "cases of necessity" it
relied upon for this conclusion, but simply listed all three.244
Based upon McCune, it appears that this section, though a depar-
ture from the common law, may not be strictly construed. As a
result, its inherent limitations could go unnoticed in Nebraska. 245
It is possible the court was simply recognizing the realities of po-
lice procedure so it could exert its control in the future. It should
also be noted that the facts of McCune may not have presented a
good case in which to test the inherent limitations concept before
the court.
With the exceptions noted above, warrantless arrest authority
in Nebraska is not significantly different than in other jurisdictions
238. Id. at 166, 201 N.W.2d at 853.
239. NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-829 (Supp. 1972).
240. 189 Neb. at 169, 201 N.W.2d at 855.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 169, 201 N.W.2d at 855.
243. NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-404.02 (Supp. 1972).
244. 189 Neb. at 169, 201 N.W.2d at 855.
245. But see State v. Brady, 202 Neb. 221, 274 N.W.2d 559 (1979), where the court
very carefully and strictly applied NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-404.02 (Reissue 1975)
in approving an arrest.
For an excellent discussion of the meaning and determination of "reason-
able cause" as used in NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-404.02 to .03 (Reissue 1975), see
ALI CODE, supra note 28, § 120.1, Commentary at 132-42. Useful Nebraska leg-
islative history can be found in Comm. on Judiciary, Minutes, L.B. 395, Neb.
Leg., 77th Sess. 1-8 (Feb. 13, 1967).
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and presents no significant problems. The question of whether
any particular arrest was authorized by Nebraska law is generally
presented in the context of the arrestor's possession of probable
cause for the arrest, not whether the arrestor possessed authority
to arrest at all. 246
IV. CITATION IN LIEU OF ARREST
Without a statutory alternative to full custodial arrest, it would
be impossible to obtain jurisdiction over the person of a criminal
defendant except by arrest and bail procedures, no matter how in-
significant the offense charged. The statutory alternative in Ne-
braska is the citation in lieu of arrest procedure, originally enacted
in 1974, based upon the American Law Institute's Model Code of
Pre-Arraignment Procedure provisions. 247 While the citation pro-
cedure does provide a practical, sensitive alternative to formal ar-
rest procedure, it also presents disadvantages and questions of its
own.
In testimony before the Committee on the Judiciary, Nebraska
246. Authority to arrest ordinarily is a state law question in the first instance.
Michigan v. DeFillippo, 99 S. Ct. 2627, 2631 (1979). Therefore, the reader may
also wish to review the following additional arrest-related statutes when con-
sidering whether any particular arrestor had authority to arrest, under Ne-
braska law: NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 14-221, 14-604 to -606 (Reissue 1977) (relating
to police officers of cities of the metropolitan class); id. § 15-326 (Reissue
1977) (relating to police officers of cities of the primary class); id. § 16-323
(Supp. 1979) (relating to police officers of cities of the first class); id. § 17-118
(Reissue 1977) (relating to police officers of cities of the second class); id.
§ 17-213 (Reissue 1977) (relating to police officers of villages); id. § 23-1710
(Reissue 1977) (relating to sheriffs); id. §§ 23-1811 to -1813, § 23-1819 (Reissue
1977) (relating to arrest and warrant issuance powers of county coroners); id.
§ 26-1,177 (Reissue 1975) (relating to constables); id. §§ 29-402.01 to .03 (Reis-
sue 1975) (dealing with arrests in shoplifting situations); id. § 29-416 (Reissue
1975) (dealing with arrest power of peace officers from other states engaged
in fresh pursuit in Nebraska); id. § 29-2266 (Reissue 1975) (dealing with ar-
rest powers of probation officers); id. § 37-603 (Reissue 1978) (relating to con-
servation officers, their status as peace officers and arrest powers); id. § 49-
801(15) (Reissue 1978) (defining "peace officers"); id. §§ 55-212 to -216 (Reis-
sue 1978) (dealing with the arrest authority of the National Guard of Ne-
braska and of other states in fresh pursuit and other situations); id. §§ 55-409
to -414 (Reissue 1978) (dealing with apprehension, arrest and restraint for
purposes of the Nebraska Code of Military Justice);" id. §§ 60-434 to -435 (Reis-
sue 1978) (relating to the Nebraska State Patrol).
247. Id. §§ 29-423, 29-426 to -430 (Reissue 1975); id. §§ 29-422, 29-424, 29-425 (Cum.
Supp. 1978); id. §§ 39-6,105, 39-6,107, 39-6,108 (Reissue 1978). See ALI CODE,
supra note 28, § 120.2.
The following interrelated statutes have since been enacted: NEB. REV.
STAT. § 29-432 (Cum. Supp. 1978); id. §§ 29-431, 29-435 (Supp. 1979). A sepa-
rate summons or notice procedure relating to game and fish law violations
appears in id. § 37-603 (Reissue 1978).
1980]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
Attorney General Clarence Meyer expressed a belief that adoption
of the citation in lieu of arrest procedure would accomplish several
salutary goals. Meyer said it would help solve bail problems be-
cause people would not be jailed as frequently; and would allow for
charging a person with a crime, but doing so without causing the
employment problems that would likely result from arresting the
person at work. Finally, some of the distance problems faced by
rural police officers would be alleviated.248
The American Law Institute believed use of the citation in lieu
of arrest procedure would avoid both a prolonged pre-appearance
detention of the accused and the necessity for a cited person to
state subsequently that he had been arrested. The Institute also
felt the power to issue a citation should reduce the pressure on
police officers to arrest someone in those situations where the of-
ficers lack authority to effect warrantless arrests, but must do
something to stabilize a given situation.24 9
The Nebraska Legislature enacted its intent into law:
It is hereby declared to be the policy of the State of Nebraska to issue
citations in lieu of arrest or continued custody to the maximum extent
consistent with the effective enforcement of the law and the protection of
the public. In furtherance of that policy, any peace officer shall be author-
ized to issue a citation in lieu of arrest or continued custody for any of-
fense which is a traffic infraction, any other infraction, or misdemeanor
and for any violation of a city or village ordinance.
2 5 0
Further, "[w] henever any person shall be charged with a traffic in-
fraction, such person shall be issued a citation .... -251 Finally,
the citations may also be issued "[i]n any case in which the prose-
cuting officer is convinced that a citation would serve all of the pur-
poses of an arrest warrant",25 2 and "when the court is convinced
that a citation would serve all of the purposes of the arrest warrant
procedures," following the filing of a complaint or information
charging any offense, specifically including felonies.253
248. Comm. on Judiciary, Minutes, L.B. 829, Neb. Leg., 83d Sess. 13-14 (Jan. 28,
1974) (remarks of Neb. Attorney General Clarence Meyer).
249. ALI CODE, supra note 28, § 120.2, Note at 19, Commentary at 143. For further
discussion of the purposes and policy of citation procedure, see Kirkpatrick,
Arres Citation and Summons-The Supreme Court Takes a Giant Step For-
ward, 30 AmI L REV. 137, 144-55 (1976).
250. NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-422 (Cum. Supp. 1978) (emphasis added).
251. Id. § 39-6,105 (Reissue 1978) (emphasis added); "traffic infraction" is defined
in id. § 39-602 (107) (Supp. 1979).
252. Id. § 29-425(1) (Cum. Supp. 1978) (emphasis added). A practical problem
here is that '"prosecuting officer" is not defined by any statute. "Prosecuting
attorney" is defined in id. § 29-104 (Reissue 1975), but the two labels do not
necessarily have the same meaning.
253. Id. § 29-425(2) (Cune. Supp. 1978). There is a partial conflict between the dis-
cretion to issue a citation conferred upon any court in this statute and the
mandatory language of id. § 29-404 (Cum. Supp. 1978), which provides in part:
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It is apparent from the statutes that citations can be used not
only as a substitute for an arrest, but also after an actual arrest as
a substitute for the bail procedure. However, beyond this point the
legislative language is unclear. In the pure citation in lieu of arrest
situation (where the officer intends only a stop for the issuance of
a citation and not an arrest), after the officer has filled out the cita-
tion, the cited person must sign the promise to appear in order to
be released from custody.254 As a general rule, refusal by the cited
person to sign the promise to appear does not seem to constitute a
separate offense. 5 However, such a refusal in the case of cita-
tions issued for traffic infractions is a misdemeanor.25 6
The officer is granted considerable flexibility in deciding
whether to cite or arrest and whether to detain, but not arrest, sub-
ject to several conditions. An officer having grounds for making an
arrest may take the accused into custody, or, if he already has, may
"detain him further" whenever.
(a) the accused fails to identify himself satisfactorily;
(b) refuses to sign the citation; or,
(c) the officer has reasonable grounds to believe:
(1) the accused will refuse to respond to the citation;
(2) such custody is necessary to protect the accused or others when
his continued liberty would constitute a risk of immediate harm;
(3) such action is necessary in order to carry out legitimate investiga-
tive functions;
(4) the accused has no ties to the jurisdiction reasonably sufficient to
assure his appearance; or,
(5) the accused has previously failed to appear in response to a cita-
tion.257
It would be simpler in some cases for the officer to arrest the ac-
Whenever a complaint shall be filed with the magistrate, charging
any person with the commission of an offense against the laws of this
state, it shall be the duty of such magistrate to issue a warrant for the
arrest of the person accused, if he shall have reasonable grounds to
believe that the offense charged has been committed.
"Magistrate" means any municipal, county or associate county judge. Id.
§ 29-103 (Reissue 1975).
The availability of the citation procedure is not to be construed to have
any effect on "the rights, lawful procedures, or responsibilities of law enforce-
ment agencies or peace officers using the citation procedure in lieu of the
arrest or warrant procedure." Id. § 29-428 (Reissue 1975).
254. Id. § 29-424 (Cum. Supp. 1978).
255. Id. § 29-424 (Cum. Supp. 1978); id. §§ 29-426 to -427 (Reissue 1975).
256. Id. § 39-6,105 (Reissue 1978).
257. Id. § 29-427 (Reissue 1975). The complexity of this statute alone may contrib-
ute to reluctance by peace officers to use the citation procedure, instead of
the more familiar arrest procedure. The officers' problem is compounded
when this statute is compared with id. §§ 29-401, 29-404.02, 29-829 (Reissue
1975). Peace officers in the field must act quickly. They do not have the time
to refer to detailed statutes, a luxury possessed by reviewing lawyers and
courts, not acting under field pressures.
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cused, than to try to sort out the facts required in deciding whether
to detain the accused further under the citation procedure.258
258. The position of the officer has been made even more confusing by the adop-
tion of recent legislation which defines an infraction as "the violation of any
law, ordinance, order, rule, or regulation, not including those related to traffic,
which is not otherwise declared to be a misdemeanor or a felony" LB. 534,
§ 1, ch. -, 1979 Neb. Laws (amending NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-431 (Cum. Supp.
1978)), except for the situations listed in NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-427 (Reissue
1975), "for any offense classified as an infraction, a citation shall be issued in
lieu of arrest or continued custody pursuant to sections 29-422 to 29-430." Id.
§ 29-435 (Supp. 1979) (emphasis added). The statutes already had specifically
provided that a person alleged to have committed an infraction could be
taken into custody if harm would likely occur to the individual or society if
such a person were not taken into custody. Id. § 29-432 (Cum. Supp. 1978).
Under the general rule of NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-401 (Reissue 1975), an of-
ficer must arrest and detain, until a warrant can be obtained, anyone found
violating any state law or city or village ordinance. But, under NEB. REV.
STAT. § 29-431 (Supp. 1979), ordinance violations are infractions, for which
officers must issue citations, unless one of the exceptions of NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 29-427 (Reissue 1975) applies. In addition, there is a conflict between the
duty to issue citations for infractions on one hand and the specific arrest pow-
ers of municipal police officers on the other. It is clear L.B. 534 (1979) has not
changed the status of any violations of state law with respect to classification
as felony, misdemeanor, traffic infraction, or other infraction under state stat-
ute. However, the same cannot be said for ordinance violations. Prior to the
adoption of NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-431 (Supp. 1979), non-traffic ordinance viola-
tions were not classified as anything but ordinance violations, with several
rare exceptions that were misdemeanors under specific statutes. See NEB.
REV. STAT. §§ 19-913 (Reissue 1977), 39-669.07 (Reissue 1978); Note, State Leg-
islative Authority to Grant Municipalities and Counties Crime-Making
Power, 27 NEB. L, REV. 473 (1948). Senator John DeCamp, through his legisla-
tive assistant, led the Judiciary Committee to believe the infraction category
was not going to have any real, present effect, by telling the Committee:
LB 534 is a bill that grew out of a legislative resolution dealing with
taking some minor offenses and setting up a category that might in-
clude certain minor offenses that wouldn't have a jail sentence and
would not carry a criminal record ....
This bill merely sets up a category. It doesn't grandfather in any cur-
rent acts. It merely sets up a category. What we put in the category
still must be determined by the legislature ....
Again,. . I wish to stress.., what is hoped to be accomplished...
is the establishment of an infraction category. This category would
not grandfather any current laws in with it. It would merely set up a
category to be ... available ....
Comm. on Judiciary, Minutes, L.B. 534, Neb. Leg., 86th Sess. 2, 3, 13 (Feb. 27,
1979) (remarks of Sen. DeCamp). Despite this expressed intention, the
adopted statute does not contain any such limiting language. The result may
be that non-penalized violations of existing statutes may now be infractions.
Further, the effect of the infraction classification on arrest powers in ordi-
nance violation cases was never mentioned. See NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 14-606, 15-
326, 17-118, 17-213 (Reissue 1977). Nor was the fact that jail sentences can be
imposed for certain ordinance violations. See id. §§ 14-102(25), 15-263, 16-225
(Reissue 1977); § 39-669.07 (Reissue 1978).
The same problems have existed in the traffic infraction statutes for some
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The state of current statutory requirements lends considerable
support to the criticism that the citation procedure commits too
much to the discretion of the individual peace officer.259 The deci-
sion to cite actually involves the exercise of no more discretion
than does the decision to detain or arrest. The additional discre-
tion comes into play after arrest, in deciding whether to then cite
and release the accused or take him before a magistrate. Tradi-
tionally, the discretion to release an arrestee has been entrusted to
magistrates using the bail procedure.260 To this extent, the policy
supporting the citation procedure seems to have balanced away
the fourth amendment policy of restricting the discretion of law
enforcement officers in favor of a new policy seeking a reduction in
the incidence of pre-appearance custody.26 1
There is no statutory requirement that a stop for the purpose of
issuing a citation be preceded by probable cause to believe an of-
fense has been committed. However, this should not pose a prob-
lem. Under the principles of Brown v. Texas,2 62 Dunaway v. New
York, 263 and Delaware v. Prouse,2 64 it should be clear that more
than the reasonable suspicion necessary to justify an investigative
detention is required under the fourth amendment to support a
stop for issuance of a citation. Whether true probable cause is a
constitutional requirement remains open to debate. The wise of-
ficer will initiate any stop as an investigative detention, unless he
is sure he has probable cause. It has been shown that probable
cause for an arrest can develop following an investigative deten-
time. Id. § 39-6,105 (Reissue 1978); § 39-602(107) (Supp. 1979). The officer in
the field is confronted not only with the conflicting arrest versus citation pro-
visions with respect to ordinance violations, but also with the different ap-
proaches to be applied to misdemeanor versus infraction stops. For
misdemeanors, the officer may arrest, cite and release, or detain in continued
custody, if one or more of the appropriate exceptions applies. For infractions,
the officer must cite and release, unless one or more of the exceptions ap-
plies. At present, there is only one state offense classified as an infraction as
part of the Nebraska Criminal Code. Id. § 28-416(6) (Cum. Supp. 1978).
259. Kirkpatrick, supra note 249, at 152-55.
260. LaFave, Alternatives to the Present Bail System, 1965 U. ILL L.F. 8.
261. The effectiveness of the bail system as it applies in minor offense situations
has been seriously questioned. See, Introduction, ABA STAxDARDS, PRE-
TRiAL RELEASE (1968); Rankin, The Effect of Pretrial Detention, 39 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 641 (1964).
The threat of a failure to appear charge, NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-426 (Reissue
1975), is probably a more effective deterrent to flight than a simple personal
recognizance bond or most misdemeanor ten percent cash bonds (at least in
Class HIEA to Class V misdemeanor cases). See id. § 29-908 (Cum. Supp.
1978).
262. 99 S. Ct. 2637 (1979).
263. 442 U.S. 200 (1979). See text accompanying notes 68-70, 71-75 supra.
264. 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
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tion.265
Regardless of the resolution of the constitutional question,
before a citing officer may take an accused into custody or con-
tinue the custody as part of the citation procedure, he must have
grounds for making an arrest.266 No valid arrest can be made with-
out probable cause. Further, the language "citation in lieu of ar-
rest" implies that probable cause must be obtained before a
citation can issue. If the procedure is to serve as a substitute for
arrest, the same probable cause standard should apply-if not as a
constitutional requirement, then certainly as a necessary implica-
tion of the statutes themselves.
Whether a stop for the purpose of issuing a citation is an arrest
is a difficult question, due partly to a poor choice of language.
There is little question that an officer seizes any person stopped
for the purpose of issuing a citation. When an officer accosts an
individual and restrains the individual's free exercise of liberty by
means of physical force or show of authority, a seizure occurs.267
But not every seizure constitutes an arrest in the constitutional
sense.
268
Courts which have considered the question of whether a stop
for the purpose of issuing a citation or notice to appear is an arrest
have gone both ways.269 The California Supreme Court has
adopted the following approach:
Viewing the situation functionally, the violator is being detained against
his will by a police officer, for the purpose of obtaining his appearance in
connection with a forthcoming prosecution. The violator is not free to de-
part until he has satisfactorily identified himself and has signed the writ-
ten promise to appear .... The detention which results (during the
265. See, e.g., State v. Anderson, 204 Neb. 186,281 N.W.2d 743 (1979); State v. Micek,
193 Neb. 379, 227 N.W.2d 409 (1975).
266. NEB. RaV. STAT. § 29-427 (Reissue 1975).
267. See note 50 supra; Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979).
268. See text accompanying notes 56-58 supra.
269. For cases holding no arrest occurs, see Barrier v. Alexander, 100 Cal. App. 2d
497, 224 P.2d 436 (1950); Hart v. Herzig, 131 Colo. 458, 283 P.2d 177 (1955); Con-
necticut v. Commonwealth, 387 S.W.2d 285 (Ky. 1965); Berry v. Bass, 157 La.
81, 102 So. 76 (1924); State v. Murray, 106 N.H. 71, 205 A.2d 29 (1964); Jones v.
State, 8 Misc. 2d 140, 167 N.Y.S.2d 536 (Ct. of Cl. 1957); City of Toledo v.
Lowenberg, 99 Ohio App. 165, 131 N.E.2d 682 (1955). For cases holding an ar-
rest occurs, see People v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 7 Cal. 3d 186,
496 P.2d 1205, 101 Cal. Rptr. 837 (1972); District of Columbia v. Perry, 215 A.2d
845 (D.C. Ct. App. 1966); Patterson v. State, 253 Ind. 499, 255 N.E.2d 520 (1970);
People v. Barman, 372 Mich. 292, 125 N.W.2d 875 (1964); Terry v. State, 252
Miss. 479, 173 So. 2d 889 (1965); Barth v. Flad, 99 R.I. 446, 208 A.2d 533 (1965);
Robertson v. State, 184 Tenn. 277, 198 S.W.2d 633 (1947). Several of these
cases do not decide the specific issue presented, but do hold the stopping of
or pursuit of a car constitutes an arrest. Since a driver cannot be cited until
stopped, it would be only simple logic to carry such decisions to the citation
situation.
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citation process) is ordinarily brief, and the conditions of restraint are
minimal. Nevertheless the violator is, during the period immediately pre-
ceding his execution of the promise to appear, under arrest.270
This rationale seems to follow the purposive approach to the law of
arrest. The emphasis is placed upon the idea that, although a cit-
ing officer does not possess the specific intent to bring the cited
person in, the officer does intend to cause the cited person to an-
swer for an offense. The difference is that the citation supplants
the need for taking the usual preliminary steps such as booking
and fingerprinting.
It cannot be argued that such a stop is not a detention for the
purpose of initiating a prosecution. However, to label such a stop
an arrest, is to place undue emphasis on the procedural function of
a citation and ignore the elements of an arrest. The brief detention
incident to the issuance of a citation is not performed with the in-
tent or purpose of taking custody of the cited person or to substan-
tially deprive him of his liberty. The real intent or purpose is to
avoid taking the cited person into custody.27 1 To that extent, the
issuance of a citation is no different than the service of a summons
or subpoena. 272
Unfortunately, under Nebraska law the detained person, while
awaiting issuance of a citation, is in custody.2 73 Only upon signing
the promise to appear is the cited person to be released from cus-
tody.274 Is this the same type of custody which may be continued
for enumerated causes?275 If so, then a detention for the purpose
of issuing a citation is "in important respects indistinguishable
from a traditional arrest, '276 in that the person awaiting issuance
of a citation is not free to leave the citing officer's presence until
completion of the citation issuance. While such a person is not
transported to a police station, nor placed in an interrogation room
or jail, such person is not free to go before signing the promise to
270. People v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 7 Cal. 3d 186, 496 P.2d 1205,
101 Cal. Rptr. 837 (1972). This decision may be a very narrow construction of
the provisions of the Vehicle Code referring to the person awaiting citation as
an "arrested person," id. at 200, 496 P.2d at 1215, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 847, as was
State v. Cook, 194 Kan. 495, 399 P.2d 835 (1965).
271. E. FisHER, supra note 24, at 44.
272. Berry v. Bass, 157 La. 81, 102 So. 76 (1924).
Many of the cases holding the stopping of a motor vehicle to be an arrest
should not have been analyzed as presenting arrest issues, but as presenting
seizure issues. E.g., State v. Kretchmar, 201 Neb. 308, 267 N.W.2d 740 (1978),
on remand, 203 Neb. 663, 280 N.W.2d 46 (1979); State v. Holmberg, 194 Neb.
337, 231 N.W.2d 672 (1975); Note, "Random" Spot Checks and the Fourth
Amendment, 55 NEB. L. REv. 316 (1976).
273. See NEB. REv. STAT. § 29-427 (Reissue 1975).
274. Id. § 29-424 (Cum. Supp. 1978).
275. Id. § 29-427 (Reissue 1975).
276. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979).
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appear without incurring the risk of a potential escape prosecu-
tion,27 7 and likely subjection to physical restraint.
Perhaps the key to the issue should be the scope of the intru-
sion. A traditional, custodial arrest is an extreme intrusion upon
the individual's privacy. A brief citation stop, lasting no longer
than is reasonably necessary, is substantially less intrusive. Ana-
lyzing the citation stop in this light focuses attention on the real
competing interests at stake; individual privacy versus the needs
of law enforcement. The procedural function of a citation loses im-
portance in comparison with these interests.
The issue is an important one. If a citation stop is an arrest,
then there is an unquestionable right to search incident to the stop
and any interrogation which occurs must be deemed custodial. If
it is not an arrest, then the search powers of the citing officer are
unclear 278 and any interrogation which occurs should be deemed
non-custodial.
While the issues raised by the citation procedure have not yet
been resolved in Nebraska, if extensively used in more than the
277. NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-912 (Cum. Supp. 1978). While the applicability of the
escape statute to such a situation is presently unsettled, the filing of such a
charge is justifiable due to the broad definition of "official detention" for pur-
poses of the new escape statute. Id. § 28-912(1).
While the escape statute appears to be the only applicable charge for a
premature departure from citation situations by persons not operating motor
vehicles nor accused of traffic infractions, it is clear that persons prematurely
departing the scene of a traffic infraction citation stop are open to charges of
operation of a motor vehicle to avoid citation, id. § 28-905, and possibly, re-
fusal to sign a citation. Id. § 39-6,105 (Reissue 1978).
278. Search incident to a citation, a topic beyond the scope of this article, has re-
ceived considerable attention elsewhere. See Agata, Searches and Seizures
Incident to Traffic Violations-A Reply to Professor Simeone, 7 ST. Louis U.
LJ. 1 (1962); Kirkpatrick supra note 249, at 150-52; Simeone, Search and
Seizure Incident to Traffic Violations, 6 ST. Louis U. L.J. 506 (1961).
Kirkpatrick states, in seeking a constitutional basis for a search incident
to a citation for an offense for which there could be no concealed or destroyed
physical evidence:
The possible physical danger inherent in the arrest process is not
present; the 'extended exposure' of the police officer to the accused
will not take place .... [There is probably some danger to the po-
lice officer after he issues a citation to an incensed citizen, although
admittedly not at the level of the danger inherent in the arrest proc-
ess....
Kirkpatrick, supra note 249, at 151-52. While the level of danger inherent in
the arrest process may not be sustained for as long a period in the citation
process, the time required to inflict serious or fatal injury is very short. One
need only assist an officer in stopping a car with several occupants on a coun-
try road late at night to appreciate the risks involved, even in a brief encoun-
ter, as well as the feelings of the officer at such a moment. See also People v.
Bannan, 372 Mich. 292, 125 N.W.2d 875 (1964); People v. Troiano, 35 N.Y.2d 476,
323 N.E.2d 183 (1974).
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area of traffic enforcement, the citation procedure will have an ef-
fect on the Nebraska law of arrest. At this time, it is clear the cita-
tion procedure provides a practical, sensitive alternative to formal
arrest procedure and its extensive use should be encouraged.
V. CONCLUSION
In determining whether an arrest has occurred in any factual
context, the policy of the fourth amendment must be recognized.
That policy is the protection of the individual's reasonable expec-
tations of privacy and freedom from governmental intrusions. To
this end, while the arrestor's intent must continue to be one of the
most important of the traditional elements of arrest, it should not
invariably be the controlling element. More emphasis must be
placed upon the attitude of the arrestee. Where the arrestor's in-
tent is clear from an objective assessment of his actions and con-
duct, and a reasonable arrestee in a similar situation would have
understood his status, there should be no difficulty. However,
where the arrestor creates an ambiguous situation with respect to
the arrestee's status, then the arrestee's reasonable assessment of
his status should control.
There is a need for the adoption of a clear, principled definition
in Nebraska's law of arrest. The case-by-case approach is totally
inadequate. Further, no rational reason exists for any distinction
between the meaning of arrest in civil and criminal cases. The
same values are at stake in either context. The Restatement of
Torts definition of arrest is an appropriate one: "An arrest is the
taking of another into the custody of the actor for the actual or pur-
ported purpose of bringing the other before a court, or of otherwise
securing the administration of the law."279 The Restatement defi-
nition focuses attention on the critical aspect of custody for the
purpose of securing the administration of the law. The courts,
under this definition, would be free to analyze detention/arrest sit-
uations by assessing the degree of intrusion involved in any
seizure of the person, custody being the key. The result would be
an analysis of objective facts, not controlled by the subjective in-
tention of either the arrestor or the arrestee. The adoption of the
Restatement definition would allow for greater recognition of the
policy of the fourth amendment in the law of arrest.
Finally, as a matter of policy, law enforcement agencies should
be encouraged to use the citation in lieu of arrest to the maximum
279. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) oF TORTS § 112 (1965). Were the RESTATEMIENT defi-
nition adopted, it would be necessary to reconsider the use of the word "cus-
tody" in NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-424 (Cum. Supp. 1978), in order to resolve the
question of whether a citation stop is an arrest. See text accompanying notes
267-78 supra.
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extent possible. Use of the arrest procedure should be restricted
to cases of necessity. The citation procedure serves all the needs
of law enforcement in most cases and gives away nothing of value
to it. Arrest, on the other hand, takes away a great deal from the
person arrested.
